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quote: Originally posted by whomod: quote: November 24, 2003
THE NATION FBI Is Monitoring War Protesters, Official Says From Reuters
WASHINGTON — The FBI has gathered data about tactics and training used by war protesters in an effort to blunt potential violence by extremist elements, a federal law enforcement official said Sunday.
The FBI warned of tactics used by such groups in a weekly bulletin circulated to 15,000 law enforcement agencies around the country last month, ahead of large demonstrations in Washington and San Francisco to protest the Iraq war.
The bulletin discussed tactics, training and organization of groups, some of which have Web sites that refer to training camps to teach activities like disrupting traffic and law enforcement during large public events, the official said.
It described activist strategies like videotaping arrests to intimidate police and using the Internet to recruit and raise funds.
The memorandum was first reported by the New York Times on Sunday.
"It contains information that we gleaned through investigation and through other means," a federal law enforcement official who asked not to be identified told Reuters.
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), appearing on ABC's "This Week," said he was concerned about reports that the FBI was monitoring war protesters.
"We have the stories going on this morning where they're using the FBI to look into demonstrations in order to find out who is demonstrating and getting into their background. That reminds me of the old Nixon times and the enemies list," he said. White House officials in the administration of President Nixon kept a list of political enemies.
The federal law enforcement official said the FBI was only interested in individuals and groups who plotted violence.
Civil rights groups quoted by the New York Times nonetheless said the monitoring of protesters was alarming.
Seig heil. Funny how at the moment I'm quite interested in the Right wing military dictatoriships in Latin America during the 20th century and how they would supress "leftist" dissent thru whatever means neccesary, and usually with right wing American support.
Great comic. It's all very true.
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quote: Originally posted by whomod: quote: November 24, 2003
THE NATION FBI Is Monitoring War Protesters, Official Says From Reuters
WASHINGTON — The FBI has gathered data about tactics and training used by war protesters in an effort to blunt potential violence by extremist elements, a federal law enforcement official said Sunday.
The FBI warned of tactics used by such groups in a weekly bulletin circulated to 15,000 law enforcement agencies around the country last month, ahead of large demonstrations in Washington and San Francisco to protest the Iraq war.
The bulletin discussed tactics, training and organization of groups, some of which have Web sites that refer to training camps to teach activities like disrupting traffic and law enforcement during large public events, the official said.
It described activist strategies like videotaping arrests to intimidate police and using the Internet to recruit and raise funds.
The memorandum was first reported by the New York Times on Sunday.
"It contains information that we gleaned through investigation and through other means," a federal law enforcement official who asked not to be identified told Reuters.
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), appearing on ABC's "This Week," said he was concerned about reports that the FBI was monitoring war protesters.
"We have the stories going on this morning where they're using the FBI to look into demonstrations in order to find out who is demonstrating and getting into their background. That reminds me of the old Nixon times and the enemies list," he said. White House officials in the administration of President Nixon kept a list of political enemies.
The federal law enforcement official said the FBI was only interested in individuals and groups who plotted violence.
Civil rights groups quoted by the New York Times nonetheless said the monitoring of protesters was alarming.
Seig heil. Funny how at the moment I'm quite interested in the Right wing military dictatoriships in Latin America during the 20th century and how they would supress "leftist" dissent thru whatever means neccesary, and usually with right wing American support.
Great comic. It's all very true.
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Liberally partisan? Yes.
True? No.
Like the other liberal propaganda I see --about the iraq war, and any number of other issues-- it is a selective omission and re-interpretation of the facts, to make things far darker than they really are. For every American soldier killed, there are a thousand schools, businesses, hospitals, etc., built in the new free Iraq.
Again, we WERE in Germany, Japan, and more recently Bosnia and Kosovo for many years more than was initially projected, to do the job right. Liberals aren't interested in doing the job right, just smearing a Republican president.
If it were Clinton or Gore's war, liberals would have a whole new --and deeply supportive-- attitude.
I commend Bush for doing the heavy lifting, that Clinton and Gore didn't have the guts to do. This war should have been fought sometine between 1995-1998.
Bush is finally laying this Iraq chapter to rest. As a spineless Clinton wouldn't do, because Clinton was more worried about polls than what was best for the U.S. he swore to preserve and protect. Even without the press on his side, Bush is not worrying about popular opinion polls to determine his policy.
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quote: Originally posted by whomod: quote: Originally posted by PJP: quote: Originally posted by JQ: 
Who payed for all this?
Those fucking morons need to get a life......and JQ that's a damn good question.
LOL!
Yeah, I can imagine that spontaneous displays of democracy would offend the right wing.

It's funny because it's true.
LOL.....it's not the display of Democracy that bothers me......it's the fact that they have nothing better to do with their time.........I hated Clinton.....but I'd be damned if I wasted a second of my life protesting against him. Fucking Bubba.
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quote: Like the other liberal propaganda I see --about the iraq war, and any number of other issues-- it is a selective omission and re-interpretation of the facts, to make things far darker than they really are. For every American soldier killed, there are a thousand schools, businesses, hospitals, etc., built in the new free Iraq.
It's funny how you criticize the "liberal media" for selective ommission and reinterpretation of the facts to make things far darker that they are, while you do the same thing to make things seem much better. A 1000:1 is much more than a slight exaggeration. Are you even counting the ones destroyed or devastated by this war? It's probably more like 1:1. But only time will tell if this war did good. Bias and exaggeration is a two way street.
I don't disagree that this war has gone good. It's been fast, there's been relatively few casualties, and Saddam Hussein has been removed from power. But I'm still a little skeptical of the justifications and agendas behind the scenes.
quote: Again, we WERE in Germany, Japan, and more recently Bosnia and Kosovo for many years more than was initially projected, to do the job right. Liberals aren't interested in doing the job right, just smearing a Republican president.
Germany and Japan were much more complicated than Bosnia and Kosovo, and even Iraq. Rebuilding industrialized nations is much more complex than rebuilding third world nations.
You're right, when you bomb the crap out of a third world nation struggling with a dictatorship, you have to stick around.
quote: I commend Bush for doing the heavy lifting, that Clinton and Gore didn't have the guts to do. This war should have been fought sometine between 1995-1998.
If it was so urgent, why didn't Bush invade when he first got into office. Sept. 11 is what got the public behind the idea of war with Iraq.
quote: Bush is not worrying about popular opinion polls to determine his policy.
You're absolutely right, he doesn't seem to listen to the majority of the people.
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The media, Liberal or Conservative, manipulates facts to fit their argument all the time. I love the way both sides are bashing the other for this when the sources they pull are just as selective with their use of truth.
I don't reall object to the idea of military use in freeing Iraq, it just bugs me that we have been repeatedly lied to and bullshit suggestions keep being made that removing Saddam will in some way stop Bin Laden's mob. My only objection to the war is that we hadn't finished the last job.
The statue of Dubya didn't cost that much, it was only cardboard.
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quote: The US secretary of state, Colin Powell, said Mr Bush was "very sensitive" to British sentiment. "We also expect to be resolving this in the near future," he told the BBC.
I almost wrote, "Well, I wish he'd released the fucking Australians while he's at it", but really, all of those people should be either POWs or in gaols with the same rights everyone else gets.
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quote: I don't disagree that this war has gone good. It's been fast, there's been relatively few casualties, and Saddam Hussein has been removed from power. But I'm still a little skeptical of the justifications and agendas behind the scenes.
JQ is a wise gimp.
I was interested to read the post about Perle's admissions, too. Some refreshing honesty.
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quote: “Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq…would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well…Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.’s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish.” -George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft quoted in Time magazine, March 2, 1998.
Why didnt lil Georgie listen to his dad?
And I love this quote from Colin Powell, made just two short years before he exaggerated Iraq's threat to the UN:
quote: "We had a good discussion, the Foreign Minister and I and the President and I, had a good discussion about the nature of the sanctions -- the fact that the sanctions exist -- not for the purpose of hurting the Iraqi people, but for the purpose of keeping in check Saddam Hussein's ambitions toward developing weapons of mass destruction. We should constantly be reviewing our policies, constantly be looking at those sanctions to make sure that they are directed toward that purpose. That purpose is every bit as important now as it was ten years ago when we began it. And frankly they have worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors. So in effect, our policies have strengthened the security of the neighbors of Iraq, and these are policies that we are going to keep in place..."--Colin Powell, February 24, 2001
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Great quotes, Whomod. After I reread Bush's State of the Union address today it's become clear to me Bush exaggrated the threats to drag us into thisd war. He was careful to avoid lies, instead he used half-truths.
Take the War in Iraq Quiz (I put interesting statements in bold):
"Iraq War Quiz by Stephen R. Shalom
1. The anti-war movement supports our troops by urging that they be brought home immediately so they neither kill nor get killed in a unjust war. How has the Bush administration shown its support for our troops?
a. The Republican-controlled House Budget Committee voted to cut $25 billion in veterans benefits over the next 10 years.
b. The Bush administration proposed cutting $172 million from impact aid programs that provide school funding for children of military personnel.
c. The administration ordered the Dept. of Veterans Affairs to stop publicizing health benefits available to veterans.
d. All of the above.
2. The anti-war movement believes that patriotism means urging our country to do what is right. How do Bush administration officials define patriotism?
a. Patriotism means emulating Dick Cheney, who serves as Vice-President while receiving $100,000-$1,000,000 a year from Halliburton, the multi-billion dollar company which is already lining up for major contracts in post-war Iraq.
b. Patriotism means emulating Richard Perle, the warhawk who serves as head of the Defense Intelligence Board while at the same time meeting with Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi on behalf of Trireme, a company of which he is a managing partner, involved in security and military technologies, and while agreeing to work as a paid lobbyist for Global Crossing, a telecommunications giant seeking a major Pentagon contract.
c. Patriotism means emulating George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, John Bolton, Tom DeLay, John Ashcroft, Lewis Libby, and others who enthusiastically supported the Vietnam War while avoiding serving in it and who now are sending others to kill and be killed in Iraq.
d. All of the above.
3. The Bush administration has accused Saddam Hussein of lying regarding his weapons of mass destruction. Which of the following might be considered less than truthful?
a. Constant claims by the Bush administration that there was documentary evidence linking Iraq to attempted uranium purchases in Niger, despite the fact that the documents were forgeries and CIA analysts doubted their authenticity.
b. A British intelligence report on Iraq's security services that was in fact plagiarized, with selected modifications, from a student article.
c. The frequent citation of the incriminating testimony of Iraqi defector Hussein Kamel, while suppressing that part of the testimony in which Kamel stated that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed following the 1991 Gulf War.
d. All of the above.
4. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleisher stormed out of a press conference when the assembled reporters broke into laughter after he declared that the U.S. would never try to bribe members of the UN. What should Fleisher have said to defend himself?
a. It wasn't just bribery; we also ordered the bugging of the home and office phones and emails of the UN ambassadors of Security Council member states that were undecided on war.
b. Oh, come on! We've been doing this for years. In 1990 when Yemen voted against authorizing war with Iraq, the U.S. ambassador declared "That will be the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast."
c. Why do you think the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act makes one of the conditions for an African country to receive preferential access to U.S. markets that it "not engage in activities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests"?
d. All of the above.
5. George Bush has declared that "we have no fight with the Iraqi people." What could he have cited as supporting evidence?
a. U.S. maintenance of 12 years of crippling sanctions that strengthened Saddam Hussein while contributing to the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians.
b. The fact that "coalition" forces have indicated that they will use cluster bombs in Iraq, despite warnings from human rights groups that "The use of cluster munitions in Iraq will endanger civilians for years to come."
c. By pointing to the analogy of Afghanistan, which the U.S. pledged not to forget about when the war was over, and for which the current Bush administration foreign aid budget request included not one cent in aid.
d. All of the above.
6. The Bush administration has touted the many nations that are part of the "coalition of the willing." Which of the following statements about this coalition is true?
a. In most of the coalition countries polls show that a majority, often an overwhelming majority, of the people oppose the war.
b. More than ten of the members of the coalition of the willing are actually a coalition of the unwilling - unwilling to reveal their names.
c. Coalition members - most of whose contributions to the war are negligible or even zero - constitute less than a quarter of the countries in the UN and contain less than 20% of the world's population.
d. All of the above.
7. The war on Iraq is said to be part of the "war on terrorism." Which of the following is true?
a. A senior American counterintelligence official said: "An American invasion of Iraq is already being used as a recruitment tool by Al Qaeda and other groups... And it is a very effective tool."
b. An American official, based in Europe, said Iraq had become "a battle cry, in a way," for Al Qaeda recruiters.
c. France's leading counter-terrorism judge said: "Bin Laden's strategy has always been to demonstrate to the Islamic community that the West, and especially the U.S., is starting a global war against Muslims. An attack on Iraq might confirm this vision for many Muslims. I am very worried about the next wave of recruits."
d. All of the above.
8. The Bush administration says it is waging war to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Which of the following is true?
a. The United States has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, viewed worldwide as the litmus test for seriousness about nuclear disarmament.
b. The United States has insisted on a reservation to the Chemical Weapons Convention allowing the U.S. President the right to refuse an inspection of U.S. facilities on national security grounds, and blocked efforts to improve compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
c. Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified on Feb. 11, 2003, "The long-term trends with respect to WMD and missile proliferation are bleak. States seek these capabilities for regional purposes, or to provide a hedge to deter or offset U.S. military superiority."
d. All of the above.
9. The Bush administration says it wants to bring democracy to Iraq and the Middle East. Which of the following is true?
a. If there were democracy in Saudi Arabia today, backing for the U.S. war effort would be the first thing to go, given the country's "increasingly anti-American population deeply opposed to the war."
b. The United States subverted some of the few democratic governments in the Middle East (Syria in 1949, Iran in 1953), and has backed undemocratic regimes in the region ever since.
c. The United States supported the crushing of anti-Saddam Hussein revolts in Iraq in 1991.
d. All of the above.
10. Colin Powell cited as evidence of an Iraq-Al Qaeda link an audiotape from bin Laden in which he called Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party regime "infidels." Which of the following is more compelling evidence?
a. An FBI official told the New York Times: "We've been looking at this hard for more than a year and you know what, we just don't think it's there."
b. According to a classified British intelligence report seen by BBC News, "There are no current links between the Iraqi regime and the al-Qaeda network."
c. According to Rohan Gunaratna, author of Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, "Since U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, I have examined several tens of thousands of documents recovered from Al Qaeda and Taliban sources. In addition to listening to 240 tapes taken from Al Qaeda's central registry, I debriefed several Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. I could find no evidence of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda."
d. All of the above."
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You know, I just can't justify responding to blatant propaganda, such as the way this "quiz" is arranged with a very narrow reading of each of the "multiple choice" events.
I've gone through many of these in my prior posts, describing the full context of these slanted "facts" listed.
I'm sure the enemies of the United States agree with you, though. And welcome this quiz.
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There's going to come a time when all the blind faith and trust is going to have to give in to the realization that you were deceived. By the way, nice aside there, equating not being sheep to comforting the enemy. LIES LIES LIES, YEAH YEAH. quote: December 5, 2003
THE WORLD Ex-General Says Israel Inflated Iraqi Threat Shlomo Brom asserts his nation's spy agencies helped U.S. and Britain make case for war.
By Laura King, Times Staff Writer
JERUSALEM — A former senior Israeli military intelligence official asserted Thursday that the nation's spy agencies were a "full partner" to the United States and Britain in producing flawed prewar assessments of Iraq's ability to mount attacks with weapons of mass destruction.
The sharply worded report by Shlomo Brom, a brigadier general in the army reserves, prompted one lawmaker to call for an independent inquiry into the performance of Israeli intelligence before the start of hostilities in Iraq.
Until now, the role of Israeli intelligence agencies in assessing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime — and the subsequent failure so far by coalition investigators to find evidence of a chemical and biological weapons program that was an imminent threat — has been the subject of little public debate here.
In Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair has been hounded by domestic critics who say prewar intelligence on Hussein's weapons program was either flawed or exaggerated — or both — in order to support President Bush's decision to go to war.
Bush also has faced criticism over the lack of proof that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, though the U.S. president has not been forced to expend nearly as much political capital as Blair in fending off contentions that the threat was deliberately distorted.
Brom, a senior researcher at one of Israel's leading think tanks, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, said intelligence produced by Israel played a significant role in augmenting the case for toppling Hussein.
"In the questioning of the picture painted by coalition intelligence, the third party in this intelligence failure — Israel — has remained in the shadows," he wrote. "And yet, Israeli intelligence was a full partner to the picture presented by American and British intelligence regarding Iraq's nonconventional capabilities."
The Israeli intelligence agencies, Brom said, "badly overestimated the Iraqi threat to Israel and reinforced the American and British belief that the weapons existed."
Brom attributed the failure to professional lapses and misreading of important data, coupled with what he called a "one-dimensional perception" of Hussein by Israel's intelligence-gathering agencies.
Brom also cited a culture of "excessive intelligence anxiety," dating back to Israel's failure, just before the Jewish state's 1973 war with Syria and Egypt, to act on clear signs of an imminent Arab attack, with near-calamitous results. "Israeli intelligence agencies have tended to overstate the threat the country faces ever since," he wrote.
Before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March, Israeli officials sent mixed signals to the public over the threat of a biological or chemical attack by Hussein's forces. They described the likelihood of Israel being targeted as slight, yet the country was placed on a war footing. Jet fighters patrolled the skies 24 hours a day. Israelis were told to prepare "sealed rooms" in which they could take shelter in the event of attack. Children were sent off to school carrying gas masks.
Many Israelis had vivid memories of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, during which Iraq lobbed 39 Scud missiles at Israel, none armed with a chemical or biological agent.
Brom said that even if Iraq had any Scud missiles left, it was difficult to understand how professional intelligence-gatherers would perceive them as a threat to Israel, particularly after 10 years of disuse.
Although Israeli military intelligence and the Mossad spy agency have suffered scandals and high-profile blunders in recent years, both are considered to be among the world's premier intelligence operations. In his report, however, Brom expressed concern that as a result of mistakes regarding Iraq, foreign services might stop trusting information provided by Israel, thus hampering cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
Brom's article, which appeared in the Jaffee Center's quarterly publication Strategic Assessment, prompted lawmaker Yossi Sarid to call for a parliamentary inquiry on prewar intelligence-gathering.
Brom held senior positions in Israeli military intelligence for 25 years before retiring from the army in 1998.
Traditionally, intelligence officers of his stature retain access to a great deal of sensitive information even after leaving active service.
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-isintel5dec05,1,4449923.story?coll=la-news-a_section
3.
2.
1.
"THE LIBERAL MEDIA!!! THE LIBERAL MEDIA!!!"
By the way GQ, nice compilation there. It's funny cuz it's all true. But again, "facts are stupid things". Bush supporeters like to live in the neocon fantasyland spun especially for their trusting hearts and minds.
If i may, one more quote:
Barbara Bush's Comments Before Iraq War Former First Lady Barbara Bush said this to Diane Sawyer two days before the start of the Iraq War. quote:
"Why should we hear about body bags and deaths and how many, what day it's gonna happen? It's not relevant. So why should I waste my beautiful mind on something like that?"

Finally, i never got any feedback from Dave TWB about Richard Perle admitting the invasion of Iraq was illegal (see posted article at the top of the page). There is no evil media to blame here. This came out of the horses mouth.
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So, what you're saying is....Barbara Bush represents all of the Bush family. ![[izzat so?]](graemlins/zatso.gif)
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quote: Originally posted by Pariah: So, what you're saying is....Barbara Bush represents all of the Bush family.
No. I just thought it intestesting at what an evil bitch she is.
For "all of the Bush family", I present you this:
http://www.hereinreality.com/familyvalues.html
Now, "i'm through with you" (to further quote the good mum).
Bush: Gave up on Osama. Mystified by the Anthrax mailer. Don't have any idea who leaked Valerie Plame's name to Novak. Can't decide who put that Mission Accomplished banner up. Confused about which BA pilot saw Air Force One headed to Iraq. Can't tell a turkey dinner from a prop.
Do this: Go to Google. Type in "miserable failure" then click on "I'm feeling lucky." What you get is no surprise but the source is astounding!
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quote: originally posted by Whomod:
Finally, i never got any feedback from Dave TWB about Richard Perle admitting the invasion of Iraq was illegal (see posted article at the top of the page). There is no evil media to blame here. This came out of the horses mouth.
I'm confident it's another Bush-bashers' narrow reading, to interpret what Perle said to be incriminating, when in full context it clearly wasn't.
Just like the one you quoted several times, where President G.W. Bush said that "there is no evidence of a link between al Qaida and Saddam Hussein", while Vice President Cheney said to Tim Russert on Meet the Press that links between al Qaida and Saddam Hussein cannot be PROVEN, but great amounts of circumstantial evidence indicates a link.
You --and the Bush bashing liberal press-- parade this as a "contradiction", when the two are clearly compatible.
Here is a link to a recent interview on PBS News with Richard Perle:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec03/funding_9-22.html
He doesn't sound critical of the Bush administration for its policy in Iraq. On the contrary, the "illegality" of U.S. action you describe is, in truth, more consistent with the 10 prior U.N. resolutions. As opposed to the posturing of France, Germany, and Bush-hating liberals worldwide.
If "illegality" is enforcing the U.N.'s, and thus the WORLD'S, 10 prior resolutions, then that's a kind of illegality the world needs. One where laws really mean something, and are enforced.
And where dictators are not free to go on killing another 1 million of their own citizens and burying them in mass graves, while simultaneously planning and keeping ready a weapons-of-mass destruction-program, to begin production the moment inspectors leave their country, in addition to the stockpiled tons of WMD's THE U.N. ITSELF says are STILL MISSING, according to their inventory count of Saddam's own records. And possibly many more already made, buried in the sand somewhere.
Perle's words are not in contradiction, or admission, of whatever definition of "illegality" you'd like to believe.
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quote: 3.
2.
1.
"THE LIBERAL MEDIA!!! THE LIBERAL MEDIA!!!"
It's just simply austorunding that anything that you don't agree with or don't want to be true instantly gets discarded into the dustbin labeled "MACHINATIONS OF THE LIBERAL MEDIA".
A shame this wasn't also part of JQ list. As you know the "liberal" media had a field day pointing out GW.Bush's lie. NOT!
quote: "The larger point is, and the fundamental question is, did Saddam Hussein have a weapons program? And the answer is, absolutely. And we gave him a chance to allow the inspectors in, and he wouldn't let them in. And, therefore, after a reasonable request, we decided to remove him from power, along with other nations, so as to make sure he was not a threat to the United States and our friends and allies in the region. I firmly believe the decisions we made will make America more secure and the world more peaceful." - George W. Bush
http://www.drmomentum.com/aces/archives/000683.html
Yep. The "liberal" media took him out of context. But that's the thing about liars. Once you start, the more you have to keep on lying and the harder it is to keep all the lies straight.
Say Dave, you say you voted for Nader because of his decades of integrity. Here.
http://www.issues2000.org/Celeb/Ralph_Nader_War_+_Peace.htm
You may not beleive me nor trust the "liberal" media, but i'm sure Nader will set you straight. 
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http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=514&e=8&u=/ap/20031206/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_what_lies_beneath_2 quote: AP: Scientists to Excavate Iraqi Graves 54 minutes ago Add Top Stories - AP to My Yahoo!
By NIKO PRICE, Associated Press Writer
MAHAWEEL, Iraq - The killers kept bankers' hours. They showed up for work at the barley field at 9 a.m., trailed by backhoes and three buses filled with blindfolded men, women and children as young as 1.
AFP/File Photo
Every day, witnesses say, the routine was the same: The backhoes dug a trench. Fifty people were led to the edge of the hole and shot, one by one, in the head. The backhoes covered them with dirt, then dug another hole for the next group.
At 5 p.m., the killers — officials of Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s Baath Party — went home to rest up for another day of slaughter.
In this wind-swept field in the central town of Mahaweel, witnesses say, this went on without a break for 35 days in March and April of 1991, during a crackdown on a Shiite Muslim uprising that followed the first Gulf War (news - web sites).
"I watched this with my own eyes," said Sayed Abbas Muhsen, 35, whose family farm was appropriated by Saddam's government for use as a killing field. "But we couldn't tell anyone. We didn't dare."
The mass grave at Mahaweel, with more than 3,100 sets of remains, is the largest of some 270 such sites across Iraq (news - web sites). They hold upward of 300,000 bodies; some Iraqi political parties estimate there are more than 1 million.
"It's as easy to find mass graves in Iraq as it once was to find oil," said Adnan Jabbar al-Saadi, a lawyer with Iraq's new Human Rights Ministry.
In the days following Saddam's fall on April 9, family members rushed to grave sites, digging for ID cards and clothing that confirmed their worst fears: The bones in the ground belonged to a son, a wife, a grandfather.
The U.S.-led occupation authority desperately tried to halt the digging, telling people that if they waited, forensic teams would unearth the remains and use the evidence to punish those responsible.
Now, an Associated Press investigation has discovered, forensic teams will begin digging in January to preserve the first physical evidence at four grave sites, their desert locations kept secret to prevent relatives from disturbing them first. a tiny back room of the deposed Iraqi president's sprawling brick-and-marble Republican Palace in Baghdad, American and British experts are using the latest technology to reach out to the dead.
They work from a growing database of 270 suspected grave sites, matching witness accounts with geological evidence, preparing for field trips by four-wheel-drive vehicle and helicopter to confirm their high-tech data with the most low-tech of methods: a shovel.
"This is not a case of `X marks the spot,'" said archaeologist Barrie Simpson. "It's not like driving down Route 66 with signposts that say, `Stop here.'"
Gypsum is one key tool. The Iraqi desert has a hard crust a foot below the surface, which is broken when a hole is dug. Minerals then mix to form gypsum, a kind of salt whose glistening white crystals are visible decades later from a satellite or from the ground.
Imagery in six spectral bands comes from a commercial satellite in orbit since 1983, which can take images of any spot on Earth every 16 days. The classified computers — which the experts switch off before a reporter enters the room — hold two decades of imagery.
If witnesses report a mass grave was dug in a certain desert location, say, in March 1991, Burch can analyze data from images taken in February 1991 and June 1991, and determine whether a pit was dug in that area during that time period.
"We don't care what it looks like," said geoscientist Bruce Gerrick. "When our pixels come back and say it's gypsum, that's it."
After seven months of work, the team has confirmed 41 mass graves across the length and breadth of Iraq — a country the size of France — some near major cities, and others miles from the nearest road.
They have a long way to go.
___
Excavating a grave site under international standards is painstaking work. To pull 100 sets of remains from the ground, it usually takes six to eight weeks.
Nobody expects scientists to dig up and identify 300,000 sets of remains. So as the scientists analyze the desert, experts are trying to identify which graves could help prosecutors build a case against those responsible for their creation.
"We're trying to make sure that there is at least one grave, and hopefully two or three, for each major period of atrocity," said Sandra Hodgkinson, director of the occupation authority's human rights office. That would mean eight to 24 mass graves selected for full exhumation.
Of the 41 mass grave sites confirmed by the coalition team, only four meet the criteria for full exhumation so far, several members of the scientific team told AP. All are in the remote desert, none closer than 10 miles from the nearest road.
Forensic teams were supposed to have been in place months ago, but several canceled or delayed their trips out of fear for their safety. Hodgkinson said several are ready to begin work in late January.
The locations of the first four graves selected remain classified. Experts fear that if people know where they are, family members — or even the killers — might try to dig them up.
Meanwhile, Iraqis will unearth graves with an eye toward identification. Entifadh Qanbar, spokesman for the Iraqi National Congress, a major political party, said that will help Iraqis move on from three decades of brutal dictatorship — at least as important as seeing justice served.
"Those people who lost family members need to know where their sons and fathers are, and to rebury them with dignity," he said. "That will bring a lot of peace and comfort to the victims' families and start a process of reconciliation."
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Iraq's U.S.-appointed rulers have drafted a plan to set up a special tribunal for crimes against humanity.
According to four people who have seen the draft — expected to be approved as soon as Sunday — it calls for Iraqi judges to hear cases from Iraqi prosecutors. International experts will participate as advisers.
Some human rights groups are uncomfortable with the plan, fearful that Iraqis won't have the expertise, or that they will sacrifice justice in their thirst for revenge. Some also say the U.S.-led government forced the plan on Iraqis.
But many Iraqis like the idea. They see an Iraqi-led process — no matter how it comes about — as more satisfying.
"I think it's very important for people to see the criminals who killed their families in court," said al-Saadi at the Human Rights Ministry.
U.S. authorities are pushing for a small number of high-profile trials — maybe 100 or so, including Saddam and other key leaders. Many Iraqis want to try thousands with links to the former regime.
"I think those highly responsible should face the courts," said al-Husseini, the doctor. "For the people who followed their orders, we need forgiveness in Iraq."
___
Villagers dug furiously in Mahaweel in April, carting away more than 2,200 sets of remains. For those they couldn't identify, they dug individual, unmarked graves, and piled the belongings found with them atop the mounds.
In Mahaweel today, 900 mounds sit topped with shreds of clothing. On one is a pair of child-sized high-tops. On another, a blood-spattered green jacket. A wallet. A string of black prayer beads.
"It's over," said Atlas Hamid Ode, whose brother-in-law was buried there. "People don't go there anymore. They have lost all hope of finding their sons. These graves, without names, will remain as shrines."
If families are losing hope, the start of formal exhumations next month is sure to churn up old feelings. It's a process complex beyond description — a fragile mix of politics, justice and revenge in a delicate country wary of all three.
And relatives hope that in the midst of it all, in an occupied land where the very notion of tomorrow is uncertain, someone, somehow, will help them find peace.
___
Niko Price is correspondent-at-large for The Associated Press.
....well i dont take the opinions of anyone who consider this an illegal or unjust war as amounting to shit....
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What does that have to do with the neocon/Bush Family conspiracy to illegally use their imperialist aims to siphon oil to Israel? . . . . . . . . .
Just thought I'd save you some typing, whomod.
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http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr11282003.htmlFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 28 November 2003 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has been dissected like no other product in the history of the US Intelligence Community. We have reexamined every phrase, line, sentence, judgment and alternative view in this 90-page document and have traced their genesis completely. I believed at the time the Estimate was approved for publication, and still believe now, that we were on solid ground in how we reached the judgments we made. I remain convinced that no reasonable person could have viewed the totality of the information that the Intelligence Community had at its disposal—literally millions of pages—and reached any conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different from those that we reached. The four National Intelligence Officers who oversaw the production of the NIE had over 100 years' collective work experience on weapons of mass destruction issues, and the hundreds of men and women from across the US Intelligence Community who supported this effort had thousands of man-years invested in studying these issues. Let me be clear: The NIE judged with high confidence that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of the 150 km limit imposed by the UN Security Council, and with moderate confidence that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons. These judgments were essentially the same conclusions reached by the United Nations and by a wide array of intelligence services—friendly and unfriendly alike. The only government in the world that claimed that Iraq was not working on, and did not have, biological and chemical weapons or prohibited missile systems was in Baghdad. Moreover, in those cases where US intelligence agencies disagreed, particularly regarding whether Iraq was reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for its nuclear weapons program, the alternative views were spelled out in detail. Despite all of this, ten myths have been confused with facts in the current media frenzy. A hard look at the facts of the NIE should dispel some popular myths making the media circuit. Myth #1: The Estimate favored going to war: Intelligence judgments, including NIEs, are policy neutral. We do not propose policies and the Estimate in no way sought to sway policymakers toward a particular course of action. We described what we judged were Saddam's WMD programs and capabilities and how and when he might use them and left it to policymakers, as we always do, to determine the appropriate course of action. Myth #2: Analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush Administration: The judgments presented in the October 2002 NIE were based on data acquired and analyzed over fifteen years. Any changes in judgments over that period were based on new evidence, including clandestinely collected information that led to new analysis. Our judgments were presented to three different Administrations. And the principal participants in the production of the NIE from across the entire US Intelligence Community have sworn to Congress, under oath, that they were NOT pressured to change their views on Iraq WMD or to conform to Administration positions on this issue. In my particular case, I was able to swear under oath that not only had no one pressured me to take a particular view but that I had not pressured anyone else working on the Estimate to change or alter their reading of the intelligence information. Myth #3: NIE judgments were news to Congress: Over the past fifteen years our assessments on Iraq WMD issues have been presented routinely to six different congressional committees including the two oversight committees, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. To the best of my knowledge, prior to this NIE, these committees never came back to us with a concern of bias or an assertion that we had gotten it wrong. Myth #4: We buried divergent views and concealed uncertainties: Diverse agency views, particularly on whether Baghdad was reconstituting its uranium enrichment effort and as a subset of that, the purposes of attempted Iraqi aluminum tube purchases, were fully vetted during the coordination process. Alternative views presented by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, the Office of Intelligence in the Department of Energy, and by the US Air Force were showcased in the National Intelligence Estimate and were acknowledged in unclassified papers on the subject. Moreover, suggestions that their alternative views were buried as footnotes in the text are wrong. All agencies were fully exposed to these alternative views, and the heads of those organizations blessed the wording and placement of their alternative views. Uncertainties were highlighted in the Key Judgments and throughout the main text. Any reader would have had to read only as far as the second paragraph of the Key Judgments to know that as we said: "We lacked specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD program." Myth #5: Major NIE judgments were based on single sources: Overwhelmingly, major judgments in the NIE on WMD were based on multiple sources–often from human intelligence, satellite imagery, and communications intercepts. Not only is the allegation wrong, but it is also worth noting that it is not even a valid measure of the quality of intelligence performance. A single human source with direct access to a specific program and whose judgment and performance have proven reliable can provide the "crown jewels"; in the early 1960s Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, who was then this country's only penetration of the Soviet high command, was just such a source. His information enabled President Kennedy to stare down a Soviet threat emanating from Cuba, and his information informed US intelligence analysis for more than two decades thereafter. In short, the charge is both wrong and meaningless. Myth #6: We relied too much on United Nations reporting and were complacent after UN inspectors left in 1998: We never accepted UN reporting at face value. I know, because in the mid 1990s I was the coordinator for US intelligence support to UNSCOM and the IAEA. Their ability to see firsthand what was going on in Iraq, including inside facilities that we could only peer at from above, demanded that we pay attention to what they saw and that we support their efforts fully. Did we ever have all the information that we wanted or required? Of course not. Moreover, for virtually any critical intelligence issue that faces us the answer always will be "no." There is a reason that the October 2002 review of Iraq's WMD programs is called a National Intelligence ESTIMATE and not a National Intelligence FACTBOOK. On almost any issue of the day that we face, hard evidence will only take intelligence professionals so far. Our job is to fill in the gaps with informed analysis. And we sought to do that consistently and with vigor. The departure of UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 certainly did reduce our information about what was occurring in Iraq's WMD programs. But to say that we were blind after 1998 is wrong. Efforts to enhance collection were vigorous, creative, and productive. Intelligence collection after 1998, including information collected by friendly and allied intelligence services, painted a picture of Saddam's continuing efforts to develop WMD programs and weapons that reasonable people would have found compelling. Myth # 7: We were fooled on the Niger "yellowcake" story—a major issue in the NIE: This was not one of the reasons underpinning our Key Judgment about nuclear reconstitution. In the body of the Estimate, after noting that Iraq had considerable low-enriched and other forms of uranium already in country—enough to produce roughly 100 nuclear weapons—we included the Niger issue with appropriate caveats, for the sake of completeness. Mentioning, with appropriate caveats, even unconfirmed reporting is standard practice in NIEs and other intelligence assessments; it helps consumers of the assessment understand the full range of possibly relevant intelligence. Myth #8: We overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991: Our judgments were based on the evidence we acquired and the analysis we produced over a 15-year period. The NIE noted that we had underestimated key aspects of Saddam's WMD efforts in the 1990s. We were not alone in that regard: UNSCOM missed Iraq's BW program and the IAEA underestimated Baghdad's progress on nuclear weapons development. But, what we learned from the past was the difficulty we have had in detecting key Iraqi WMD activities. Consequently, the Estimate specified what we knew and what we believed but also warned policymakers that we might have underestimated important aspects of Saddam's program. But in no case were any of the judgments "hyped" to compensate for earlier underestimates. Myth #9: We mistook rapid mobilization programs for actual weapons: There is practically no difference in threat between a standing chemical and biological weapons capability and one that could be mobilized quickly with little chance of detection. The Estimate acknowledged that Saddam was seeking rapid mobilization capabilities that he could invigorate on short notice. Those who find such programs to be less of a threat than actual weapons should understand that Iraqi denial and deception activities virtually would have ensured our inability to detect the activation of such efforts. Even with "only" rapid mobilization capabilities, Saddam would have been able to achieve production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons in the midst of a crisis, and the Intelligence Community would have had little, if any, chance of detecting this activity, particularly in the case of BW. In the case of chemical weapons, although we might have detected indicators of mobilization activity, we would have been hard pressed to accurately interpret such evidence. Those who conclude that no threat existed because actual weapons have not yet been found do not understand the significance posed by biological and chemical warfare programs in the hands of tyrants. Myth #10: The NIE asserted that there were "large WMD stockpiles" and because we haven't found them, Baghdad had no WMD: From experience gained at the end of Desert Storm more than ten years ago, it was clear to us and should have been clear to our critics, that finding WMD in the aftermath of a conflict wouldn't be easy. We judged that Iraq probably possessed one hundred to five hundred metric tons of CW munitions fill. One hundred metric tons would fit in a backyard swimming pool; five hundred could be hidden in a small warehouse. We made no assessment of the size of Iraq's biological weapons holdings but a biological weapon can be carried in a small container. (And of course, we judged that Saddam did not have a nuclear weapon.) When the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), led by David Kay, issued its interim report in October, acknowledging that it had not found chemical or biological weapons, the inspectors had then visited only ten of the 130 major ammunition depots in Iraq; these ammunition dumps are huge, sometimes five miles by five miles on a side. Two depots alone are roughly the size of Manhattan. It is worth recalling that after Desert Storm, US forces unknowingly destroyed over 1,000 rounds of chemical-filled munitions at a facility called Al Kamissiyah. Baghdad sometimes had special markings for chemical and biological munitions and sometimes did not. In short, much remains to be done in the hunt for Iraq's WMD. We do not know whether the ISG ultimately will be able to find physical evidence of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons or confirm the status of its WMD programs and its nuclear ambitions. The purposeful, apparently regime-directed, destruction of evidence pertaining to WMD from one end of Iraq to the other, which began even before the Coalition occupied Baghdad, and has continued since then, already has affected the ISG's work. Moreover, Iraqis who have been willing to talk to US intelligence officers are in great danger. Many have been threatened; some have been killed. The denial and deception efforts directed by the extraordinarily brutal, but very competent Iraqi Intelligence Services, which matured through ten years of inspections by various UN agencies, remain a formidable challenge. And finally, finding physically small but extraordinarily lethal weapons in a country that is larger than the state of California would be a daunting task even under far more hospitable circumstances. But now that we have our own eyes on the ground, David Kay and the ISG must be allowed to complete their work and other collection efforts we have under way also must be allowed to run their course. And even then, it will be necessary to integrate all the new information with intelligence and analyses produced over the past fifteen years before we can determine the status of Iraq's WMD efforts prior to the war. Allegations about the quality of the US intelligence performance and the need to confront these charges have forced senior intelligence officials throughout US Intelligence to spend much of their time looking backwards. I worry about the opportunity costs of this sort of preoccupation, but I also worry that analysts laboring under a barrage of allegations will become more and more disinclined to make judgments that go beyond ironclad evidence—a scarce commodity in our business. If this is allowed to happen, the Nation will be poorly served by its Intelligence Community and ultimately much less secure. Fundamentally, the Intelligence Community increasingly will be in danger of not connecting the dots until the dots have become a straight line. We must keep in mind that the search for WMD cannot and should not be about the reputation of US Intelligence or even just about finding weapons. At its core, men and women from across the Intelligence Community continue to focus on this issue because understanding the extent of Iraq's WMD efforts and finding and securing weapons and all of the key elements that make up Baghdad's WMD programs— before they fall into the wrong hands—is vital to our national security. If we eventually are proven wrong—that is, that there were no weapons of mass destruction and the WMD programs were dormant or abandoned—the American people will be told the truth; we would have it no other way. Stu Cohen is an intelligence professional with 30 years of service in the CIA. He was acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction was published
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http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/hamza.html Let me ask you about the report that, on the eve of the Gulf War, Iraq was nearly ready to assemble a first crude kind of nuclear bomb. Yes. There was a program--that's called the Crash Program--to use the French fuel, which is bomb-grade, [and] extract the uranium out of it. ...The process of cutting the fuel and preparations started, and the bomb model was made, a complete bomb mock-up without the fuel. It was a little too big. And the strategy of the time was not to explode the device, which would be undeliverable. You have to have credibility that you can deliver also the device. So, Kamel insisted on miniaturizing the mock-up. This is Hussein? Hussein Kamel, yes. And the idea was, you don't need just a nuclear bomb, you need a missile? If they are going to do a test, the consensus was best as that can be done, is a missile in the Western desert. And then you prove deliverability and a bomb that can be used as a weapon and capability to deliver it. So, they needed miniaturization. And the processing of the fuel was put on hold. And that's in November, November '90. Then the war became too close. And by the onset of the war, they still have not managed to miniaturize it. So, the fuel was not processed .... So, the Crash program failed to deliver? Failed to deliver. It was close. They had the mock-up. All they needed was the fuel. And the fuel was there. All they needed was to process it. But it was not a deliverable weapon. It was a device that you could explode anywhere ... (inaudible) in a stationary form. Who ordered the Crash program? Hussein Kamel...of course... on the orders of Saddam. It was a last, some sort of a last resort, a point of last resort, to demonstrate capability. Iraq was off-limits then to inspections. So, nobody would know if you had more of this or not. ...ut it failed, because it needed a lot of work to miniaturize the device. Better explosives. Better manufacturing. Also, it needed the processing itself. They were not sure if they lost material, lost uranium, during the processing. You were involved for a long time with an Iraqi nuclear weapons development program. Tell me about the scope and the scale of that program. Initially, in 1972, we proposed a program, actually, to get some attention from the authorities, and some support. We had no money. The Atomic Energy was a small, almost dying organization. But then Saddam apparently caught on to the proposal as a possibility. And he wanted it. Actually, originally, now, as we understand things now, originally he solicited that proposal. So, Saddam wanted nuclear weapons? He took over Atomic Energy in '73, become chairman. ... He supervised our purchases from France, Italy, other places. And we were on our way to a plutonium bomb. We built a reactor. We bought a separation facility that reprocessed the fuel and gave the plutonium out. A small lab, but you can easily duplicate it. It's the same process. Just make more of it. And these things you're buying from the West? Oh, yes. We bought from France, from Italy, mostly. When the Israelis destroyed the Iraqi reactor in June of '80, then Saddam ordered an alternate program for the bomb, a direct one. ... So, we went underground with a secret program to [en]rich uranium. ... In '82, we started the Office of Research and Development, started, headed by Dr. Jafr. And we started, I was with him, I was on the defusion [staff] and ... he was running the MS electromagnetic separation for uranium .... We continued on that till '85. I was asked in '85 to start the development of nuclear weapons. How big a program was this? Give me some sense of how serious this was, what kind of money, how many people--? MS costed around $5 billion. Five billion dollars? ....A lot of it went into private accounts. But it cost $5 billion. And, actually, the estimate is the $5 billion only for Tarmiya. The other one, the alternate support to this program, would have estimated also another $5 billion. But the $5 billion that was spent on the war covered the MS. The program overall, with the nuclear weapon program development, probably cost in the range of $10 billion. And some support was given also from some Arab countries when Osirak was hit, for replacement of Osirak. It was used also for the bomb program. The staffing till the war, was about 7,000. Included several hundred high-degreed people with PhDs and MS, probably a couple of thousand BACs, and the rest were mostly supportive staff and technicians. During, or after the war, immediately after the war, a huge recruitment started, presumably, on the face of it, to rebuild the country through Atomic Energy capabilities. Which happened, in a sense. Atomic Energy rebuilt power stations, telephone exchanges, refineries, including Saddam's palaces. And that brought in another 5,000. So, Atomic Energy now is in the range of 12,000. That includes the civilian portion, the declared portion, and the portion working in the military industry. So, you have a total staff of 12,000 fully capable, seasoned now, working in all these rebuilding programs, with achievements behind them. They got the country back on track. There is electricity and telephones now. And gas and oil and everything. And this is all Atomic Energy. So, they have achieved-- Now they are heroes, because of their achievements. Now they are more confident, more experienced, and now, if you ask them again, they will do a better job, I guess. Do you think Iraq still wants to make a nuclear bomb? There is no explanation for all this give and take with UNSCOM and those confrontations, and Iraq's defiance over all this period,unless it wants to preserve this capability. Now, Saddam took over the program personally. And ran it personally. And supervised it personally. And actually Atomic Energy was part of the Ministry of Higher Education. It was part of the educational system. It was transferred to the Revolutionary Council, to be directly under his command. OK, when we wanted to develop weapons, he put us under Kamel, who runs the Special Security Forces that protect him personally--so, again, under his personal protection system. So, the same people who were protecting Saddam Hussein were in charge of developing nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons. So, you can see, throughout, that this is a personal interest. He has a very personal interest in developing the bomb. It was his hand, directly, that was doing it and supervising it, and protecting it. This is a program that, eventually, $10 billion is being spent on, as many as 12,000 people working on it, how is it that Iraq was able to keep this program essentially secret from the international inspectors. Not UNSCOM. I'm talking in the past, IAEA-- Yes. The IAEA actually was at a very disadvantage, relative to a program like this. When a state is determined to deceive the IAEA, the IAEA, as an international body, works within consensus. That is not a monolithic institution that can take care of things on its own. It works within a system, an international, the UN system. Now, they didn't have photographs, aerial-- There were aerial and satellite photographs of ... It was beginning to become huge. And we were worried of being discovered, because of the growth of buildings and all. And the IAEA was now allowed to go into those buildings. And it was not given intelligence information by the West and by the countries who knew-- Intelligence was not shared with the IAEA. The IAEA cannot be too aggressive. It will be thrown out, to lose cooperation. ... It knew of the centrifuge, it was published in Der Spiegel at the time, and there was a huge scandal about it. Because that had come from Germany. Yes. And with German expertise. So, but still, if it had followed on it aggressively with Iraq it would have lost some of its cooperation with Iraq. So, there are always the Western economic interests here? Western economic interest, its own interest, its accessibility, the accessibility of the states to IAEA inspectors at stake here. The IAEA is a weak organization. If it's thrown out, I mean, OK, it could raise some fuss about it. But it really has no great leverage, except what the big powers give it. ...What did you think of UNSCOM back when they first started, after the Gulf War, they're coming in, this is this new type of inspection from a new organization, supposedly backed by the Security Council? Two organizations were formed, actually--UNSCOM and the action team, which had an IAEA angle. The action team was after the nuclear and UNSCOM was after the rest of the weapon systems--biological, chemical and missile. ... Both organizations initially worked the same and achieved a great deal, ... destroying most of ... what they knew existed, what were allowed or seen by them. There were some confrontations along the way. But by 1995, when Hussein Kamel defected and revealed, and the Iraqi government, revealed a huge number of documents, they discovered the extent of deception, .... Iraq, for example, did not declare much of its nuclear weapon program. ... ['T]ill '95, the Iraqi admitted only a research capability, that they were doing some small-scale research. .... In '95, they had a documentation, though partial, not full--the other documents were partly destroyed, some pages taken out, some of the valuable information removed--but still they had some admission by the Iraqi government--. ... So, they have to be followed. The gaps have to be filled. And the gaps in knowledge has to be understood. There has to be a wholly new picture. That's where the trouble started. Then the Iraqi government made a mistake, it realized later, in delivering all these documents. But it wanted to preempt what Kamel was going to say. That was the idea. But it was a mistake. They gave a lot of documentation to international organizations and they had to fill in the rest. --and so they then had to cover their tracks-- So, they have to come clean. They wanted to come clean, OK? They could not come fully clean, then they'll have to declare things they don't want to give. So, they give partial documentation in a hurry. There were some notes, there were some documents they shouldn't have, if they wanted, if they were serious, they shouldn't have. ...There were two problems at the time. First, access to scientists. The access to scientists wasn't much there before that, because they didn't know who I am, for example, when I left. There is not much information about what's going on in the scientists' angle. There was more pressure on that. Iraq fears most the losing of the scientists--more than equipment. Equipment are replaceable. Scientists are not. These are highly trained people, experienced, and what's going on with Iraq now, nobody is coming back in. People who left with scholarships, who trained in the West, very few of them are coming back in. Iraq is losing its capabilities. It lost most of its university and high-level cadres, most of its doctors, the good ones ... and such. ... They can't travel, their families cannot leave the country, they are under strict surveillance. Saddam evaluated this more or less correctly, that equipment he can buy, destruction of buildings, there's nothing cheaper than cement in Iraq, OK? Basic material on buildings available, equipment can be purchased or smuggled in--and he has a huge smuggling operation. And so, what he cannot replace is a scientist who leaves. UNSCOM started becoming aggressive in that direction, too, and the action team. Which is good. And I sense this is the real disarmament, is removing the people who can reconstitute the programs. And the problems are started more on that direction. So, the range, the full range, of the weapon industry in Iraq, the proscribed ... industry, became better known and better understood. But the capabilities are still there. ...[I]n your estimation, is Iraq still capable of making a nuclear bomb? I still think it is. If it managed to get fissile material, and that's the bottleneck there. If it managed to get that, either from Russia, from some of the ex-Communist states, one way or the other, then it is within two to six months, ... because they already built a mock-up, complete. They already have a trigger system. They already have the explosives--not as good as they should be, but they had plenty of time, eight years, to develop better explosives. And these are not proscribed. Iraq can work freely on explosives. OK? Casting, they perfected before the war. They can cast uranium. They had the explosive necessary, but they have better ones now, I'm sure. They have better design and development after the war. This is all they had to do. As you know, the weapons inspections have been halted now for several months. And there's no immediate prospect that they would start again. What do you think must happen? Now, why would you throw the inspectors out, unless you have something to hide or something to do, right? Why would he create such havoc with the inspection system and with your own possibility of being let go again, in trade and without sanctions, and sell his oil as freely as he did before. Now, Saddam thinks only in military terms. Thinks in terms of weapons, in terms of armies, in terms of-- His power base is this: It's not a democratic country, certainly is not a popular base, it was shown. Fourteen districts, governments in Iraq, out of the 18, rebelled against him immediately and toppled whoever was running those governments. So, he does not have faith anymore that he has a secure base in Iraq. His secure base is his own security forces, his own Republican Guard, and his weapons. And he has to have all those. Now, his weapons will give him immunity from being attacked again, from being weakened. It will give him aura in the Arab world of power and invincibility. Iraq is the only Arab state with all these capabilities, don't forget that. Nobody else has these capabilities.... So, Iraq, with these weapons, will be distinguished in the Middle East as the only powerful state, according to Saddam, in Saddam's understanding. It will be a match for Israel, and that's what he wants. So, with these weapons, and with sanctions, Saddam will be the ruler of the whole region; more or less, he'll be like Nasser, then crowned ruler of the region. Nasser used, the aura of Nasser toppled many governments in the Middle East, including Iraq's. So, after all these years of bombing, of trying to contain, of trying to eliminate his arsenal, you're saying that, left uninspected at this moment, he could be as strong as ever? Yes. And in a short period, too. He knows time is not on his side. He definitely knows that. He has a very good sense of his situation. And he knows time is not on his side and he needs to expedite whatever he's doing. Now, he has more experienced teams now. And don't forget, Atomic Energy is the only organization ... that has the full capability of rebuilding whatever it wants to rebuild. So, it rebuilds a factory, rebuilds refineries, power stations, ... it can rebuild chemical and biological, too. It can design things and build them from the ground up. It's the only organization in Iraq capable of doing that. That's why it was used to rebuild Saddam's palaces. .... Actually, he's better organized, more experienced now. The old guards like me, who wouldn't really go all the way with him, are replaced now. People who are in charge now are more in line with what he wants. They are not scientists trained in the West and they have their own egos and their own thinking of what should be done. These are people who'll do exactly what he tells them to do. Why did you choose to defect? The war did it. By entering Kuwait, we are not dealing with a rational leadership now. I mean, many people, even including in his party, were horrified of entering Kuwait. I mean, it never happened, an invasion of an Arab state to another Arab state, for reasons of money. It just didn't make sense. So, we knew we are going down the drain now. The whole country is going down the drain. When it became obvious--the invasion was in August--by December, it became obvious that we are not getting out. There were promises of leaving Kuwait within two weeks when we entered Kuwait. And war is imminent, I resigned. It was just insane. It just didn't make sense. Now, building a bomb for this system, is real insanity now. It just didn't make any more sense. I had difficulty resigning, because, at the time, it was not regarded as patriotic or loyal to resign in the middle, over a month before the war I resigned. But I had good connections. ...[Kamel] had some respect for me and a good idea about me. So, he said, "Let me go. He's tired now. It's really nothing. Just let him go." That was a dangerous, at the time, period for me. Then I planned on leaving. Then it became obvious what I was thinking was correct, after the war. The Shiites were massacred, the Kurds were massacred, the whole country fell apart, 14 governments rebelled against the state. So, and the massacres of the Shiites itself--I am a Shiite myself, and I come from the south--I lost a brother, I lost some members of my family. So, it became personal by then. But the decision was made earlier, in general principles. It gradually became dangerous. I was out of the system and the system was crumbling. And when states crumble, they become more dangerous. They become more of a police state, suspicions become much more rampant. So, they started killing scientists. One was killed in Jordan, who worked on the centrifuge. One was killed and then thrown in a ditch in a farm near mine, on a ranch near my ranch. And I knew the process had started of elimination, of getting more control. So, I decided it's about time to leave. I left everything: my family, my property, everything, just walked out and went to the safe haven in the North. Everybody pushed me to leave, actually. Everybody said, "It's too dangerous to stay. Just get out." .... When they pick you up, you're finished. There's no recourse after that. You have a choice now of getting out rather than staying, but, after that, you have no choice. ... [T]here are now charges from Scott Ritter, who was one of the inspectors, saying that Western intelligence agencies undermined UNSCOM's efforts by ... using UNSCOM as a way into Iraq to spy. Do you have any reactions to those kinds of charges? In a sense, Ritter, by doing this, almost destroyed now UNSCOM. ... Probably these revelations, which he had to share, the international inspection system itself now is in danger, because not many states would be forthcoming in allowing such an inspection system anymore, without calculating the possibility of ... having spies from the big power in charge of the teams. Now, but UNSCOM, in a sense, had no recourse. I mean, Saddam used his own special security organization to be in charge of the weapons systems--their safety, their transport, their whatever. So, saving the weapons was given to SSO, the Special Security Organization. Now, if you spy on the SSO, to try to find where the weapons is, you get some extra information. And this is what happened in many cases. Gradually, you have to get in deeper and deeper into the layers of the Iraqi government, and closer and closer to Saddam, to know what's going on. Because only the people around him know what's going on. So, they have to go to those people. Now, in getting so deep, you will find many of Iraq's secrets. Now, Iraq is an enemy to the US now. ... And the people who work in these groups have nationalities ... so they would, we'd expect, and they would use-- And that's been classic. I mean, even in old organizations that happened--infiltration, information that leaks to various states, and information reported directly to the other states. We had that in IAEA. We had two informers in the IAEA, who will report to Iraq directly. You had Iraqi informers inside the international-- Inspectors, yes, inspectors. They were to report to us directly. ... And they told us many of the inside secrets of the IAEA. So, that's used. I mean, why everybody is surprised about it, I don't know. But the end result of it, it will undermine the international inspection system, so I don't know what's the point of it right now? One imagines, if you had informers inside the IAEA, that Iraq was trying to do the same thing with UNSCOM? ... Oh, yes, Kamel employed one of the guys as a secretary to one of the groups, and when he was being debriefed [by UNSCOM after he defected from Iraq], that guy was present there, so Kamel threw him out. He told him, "I employed you, why are you here? You were reporting to me." ... There's nothing new. Everybody uses it. So, the hue and the cry is, I don't know what it's about. Everybody uses this. I'm not trying to say it's alright. It did undermine the international inspections. But why does it have to come now? And why is it made such a big deal right now, with all these revelations, when the whole system now is about to-- ... Anyway, it ended up almost, now, destroying UNSCOM and putting all the inspection under suspicion and Iraq would be now in a better position to probably dictate who is going to come, on a nationality basis. ... And your point is that if inspections, and tough inspections, don't continue-- Oh, he'll get weapons in no time.... Without ongoing monitoring, Saddam won; it has to be there. It has to be ongoing, to prevent him, at least make it difficult for him to rebuild his system. And real monitoring, not the old monitoring we used to have from the IAEA ... . Let me ask you a political question that's been raised. ...[Y]ou hear the argument made that economic sanctions are harming the Iraqi people more than Saddam, and that women and children are suffering and dying. What do you think about that argument? What is happening-- Now, Iraq is selling oil, alright, for what, more than a year now? Now, the rations has not increased. So, where's the oil money going? ...Several cases [of smuggling] are reported by UNSCOM and other organizations. So, ... if the sanctions are removed, this is what is going to happen: Oil money will be freely spent by Saddam without restrictions ... removing sanctions would benefit the people, I think, is a false claim. It will never go down to the people. It will stay with Saddam and his clique and his cronies, and his favorite groups. ... So, the ultimate answer here is, it sounds like, the end of Saddam Hussein? Yes. Keep him under lid, keep him without money, reduce his power, keep him under inspection, until a solution is found, to get rid of him. This is the only way. If you allow him to sell as much oil as he wants, which he's more or less doing now, and spend it as he wishes, and it goes to his people, to weapons, to more weapons of mass destruction. People will get nothing out of it. I mean, even during the Iran-Iraq war, with Iraq pumping ... his ration of oil with the OPEC, and more sometimes, ... [t]here were no medicines in the market. There were shortages. There were always shortages. And money was going to weapons of mass destruction, to Atomic Energy, to chemical weapons, biological weapons ... ............. And here I thought the people of Iraq died due to American sanctions... ![[yuh huh]](images/icons/rolleyes.gif)
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Three great posts, Mister JLA.
Hard evidence in the case against Saddam, that is vastly under-reported.
Interesting in the concluding paragraphs of your second post(interviewing Dr. Khidir Hamza, Iraq's highest ranking nuclear scientist, and for a time Saddam's appointed Director of Nuclear Weaponization, until he resigned, and later fled Iraq in 1994), where Dr. Khidir says that EVEN IF SANCTIONS HAD BEEN LIFTED, that the Iraqi people would not have gotten ANY additional income or medical care, and that the additional economic revenue would have gone straight to WMD's.
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quote: Originally posted by whomod: [QB] In light of this:
[QUOTE]Iraqi Teens Pummel Bloodied U.S. Soldiers
MOSUL, Iraq - Iraqi teenagers dragged two bloodied U.S. soldiers from a wrecked vehicle and pummeled them with concrete blocks Sunday, witnesses said, describing the killings as a burst of savagery in a city once safe for Americans.
Another soldier was killed by a bomb and a U.S.-allied police chief was assassinated.
The U.S.-led coalition also said it grounded commercial flights after the military confirmed that a missile struck a DHL cargo plane that landed Saturday at Baghdad International Airport with its wing aflame.
Nevertheless, American officers insisted they were making progress in bringing stability to Iraq and the U.S.-appointed Governing Council named an ambassador to Washington — an Iraqi-American woman who spent the past decade lobbying U.S. lawmakers to promote democracy in her homeland.
http://www.commentary.org/vincent.htm
BY LATE October, there seemed widespread agreement in the Western press that the United States was failing in Iraq, where I had been living for the past month and a half. Saddam Hussein, I was reminded by television reports and pieces on the Internet, was still at large; the weapons of mass destruction that had been the ostensible reason for American intervention were looking like figments of "sexed-up" intelligence reports, if not a plot by the Bush administration to deceive the American people; and, by precipitously overturning the rock of the Baathist regime, the U.S. had succeeded only in releasing thieves, kidnappers, rapists, terrorists, and suicide bombers to prey at will on the Iraqi people. With its faked reasons for embarking on military adventurism and its patent inability to fulfill its postwar promises, America had earned the enmity of the world. And rightly so.
In Baghdad, however, the picture could not have looked more different. Waiters smiled at me when I identified myself as an American, cabbies brushed their palms together in a good-riddance gesture as they declared, "Saddam gone, America great!," and on the campus of Baghdad University I was approached by a man who wished to tell me "how honored Iraqis are that the Americans came to rid us of a tyrant." Opinion surveys attested to the conviction of most Iraqis that their lives would improve over the next five years, and their desire that coalition forces remain in the country at least until law and order were restored. With additional numbers of Iraqi police on the streets, this was already happening—rates of all major crimes were dropping.
As for those elusive weapons of mass destruction, in my six weeks in the country I met precious few Iraqis who even alluded to them. Instead, they were focusing, with relief and gratitude, on what was perhaps the major reason Bush had cited for going to war—the removal of Saddam Hussein. "Even if those weapons turn out to be an excuse for America to invade Iraq, I say fine," remarked Nasser Hasan, a poet and former member of the Iraqi national chess team whose translation skills and insights I would find invaluable during my visit. "Whatever it took to finish Saddam." Or, as a painter named Muhammad Rassim put it, "in our minds, the end of Saddam Hussein was the reason for going to war."
How bad was Saddam? The ques tion may seem naive: the answer, after all, lies in innumerable journalistic stories and has been documented, in hideous detail, in human-rights reports for everyone to see. But to appreciate the depth of Iraqi suffering under his decades-long rule you have to visit the country and absorb the seemingly endless individual tales of brutality and violence. They, in their nightmarish sum, constitute justification enough for the war against Saddam.
My own direct education began on my first day. The twelve-hour drive from Amman, Jordan to Baghdad ran through the area west of the city known as the "Sunni Triangle"—the traditional stronghold of Saddam loyalists. Here, in towns like Ramadi and Faluja, was where Baathist holdouts and their foreign recruits were still ambushing U.S. soldiers. As we drove, stretches of lush greenery rose up inexplicably from the surrounding desert. An Iraqi-American traveling with me explained that, to reward his followers, Saddam had created this "Garden of Eden" by diverting water from the Euphrates. But, as with everything in Iraq, that was not the whole story. In the early 1990’s, seeking to suppress a revolt in southern Iraq, Saddam had dammed, burned, and bombarded nearly 12,000 square miles of marshes, causing catastrophic ecological damage. "In his way," commented my traveling companion, "he both turned a desert into a garden and a garden into a desert."
Like most moderately informed Americans, I had read stories of Saddam Hussein’s cruelty: the estimated 5,000 killed in the 1988 poison-gas attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja, for example, or the grisly 1999 murder of the Shiite cleric Sadeq al-Sadr (Saddam’s thugs drove nails into the grand ayatollah’s head after first raping his sister in front of him). I had tended to relegate such tales to a familiar catch-all category: more evidence of the sorry state of world affairs. Not until the fall of the tyrant and my decision to see postwar Iraq for myself did I begin reading the documents prepared over the years by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other monitoring groups. They were shocking.
THE FIRST thing I discovered was that it was nearly impossible to compute how many people the tyrant had actually killed, whether by direct or indirect means. In 1980, for example, Saddam initiated his eight-year war with Iran, leading to the combat deaths of perhaps 375,000 Iraqis; in 1987-88, the notorious Anfal campaign to suppress anti-government sentiment in the Kurdish-dominated area of northern Iraq managed to do away with 100,000 people (including the inhabitants of Halabja). In 1990, he invaded Kuwait, provoking Gulf War I, which resulted in perhaps another 100,000 Iraqi combat deaths. Then there were the untold thousands of lives lost in the aftermath of that war, when Saddam brutally put down Shiite revolts in the southern part of the country. As for Gulf War II, an accurate tally of Iraqi combat and civilian deaths is still unavailable, but we can add to the bloody account every loyalist killed by U.S. troops and every innocent Iraqi caught in a crossfire.
This does not include summary executions. The UN and human-rights groups have noted Saddam’s habit of "cleansing" prisons by killing their inmates. The record is appalling: in 1984, 4,000 political prisoners killed at the Abu Ghraib jail, and 2,500 more between 1997 and 1999; from 1993 through 1998, 3,000 inmates killed at the Mahjar prison, often by machine gun. In the south, Saddam murdered more than 100 prominent Shiite clerics. In 1999, security forces fired into a demonstration and killed hundreds of civilians, including many women and children. "Nonjudicial" executions of criminals and army deserters, often by means of beheading, likewise ran into the thousands.
To dispose of the bodies, Saddam resorted to the expediency of mass graves. More than 100 of these bleak sites have been unearthed from the Kurdish north to the Shiite south, with perhaps hundreds more waiting to be dug up. (In September, British authorities unearthed some 25 bodies buried under a traffic island in Basra.) The discovery of these killing fields has generated heartbreaking television scenes, with images of people frantically untying parcels of bones for evidence of missing loved ones. In one haunting scene, a man held a small bag of skeletal fragments to his nose as if to inhale the scent of his murdered son.
But in the catalogue of Saddam’s evil, perhaps the most gruesome entry concerned the use of torture. Favored methods included the disfigurement and branding of criminals, such as chopping off fingers or tearing out tongues that had uttered anti-Saddam thoughts. Other methods involved rape, electric shock, beating with an axe handle, the penetration of victims’ limbs and chests with a power drill, or the gradual lowering of bound captives into a bath of acid. Men were fed alive into wood-shredding machines. A general who had earned Saddam’s displeasure was devoured by rabid dogs. According to one macabre report, women prisoners were forced to eat chunks of their own flesh that Baathist thugs had sliced from their bodies.
Then there were the refugees: nearly 100,000 Kurds driven from their homes in the Anfal campaign; 500,000 Shiites rendered homeless by the destruction of the southern marshes. Beginning in 1969, Saddam deported from Iraq tens of thousands of so-called Kurd Failyi, or people with the ill luck to be both Kurdish and Shiite; at least 10,000 of these unfortunates who once lived in the area of Baghdad are still missing, their whereabouts unknown.
The list goes on, extending from the massively grotesque to the petty—people forced from jobs, or denied jobs, or harassed by security officials, or simply forced to live lives of self-censorship and fear. Saddam’s tyranny was complete, total, inextricably intermixed with the living cells of Iraqi society like a cancerous tumor that, under the world’s neglect, grew and grew until forcibly removed by the United States.
STILL, THESE were only reports, and I needed to hear with my own ears the testimony of survivors. And so one of my first stops in Baghdad was the National Association of Iraqi Human Rights, located in the Mustansiriya district northwest of the city’s center.
"I deserted from the army and spent five years hiding from Saddam Hussein," said Asad al-Abady, the association’s deputy director. His was one of the milder cases of persecution I heard about over several afternoons seated on a hard sofa in his sparsely furnished office. Founded in 1996 in Jordan—where its current director still lives—the association has seventeen offices throughout Iraq, making it the oldest and largest of the country’s four human-rights groups. Its purpose is to collect information and personal testimony on a range of issues, from the plight of Iraqi refugees to instances of torture, rape, and execution. The idea is eventually to pre sent the findings to the new ministry of human rights and the ministry of justice.
When I asked Abady about the number of case histories his group had accumulated, he responded by holding up a single gray folder. "This is a Baath party list, made in 1987, of 33 people whom the regime arrested in 1980 and who were at that point still awaiting trial. Sixteen years later, we have no idea what happened to them." He dropped the folder into a cardboard box filled with similar folders and slid it across the floor. "If you knew the contents of this one box alone, you would faint." Then he took me to a dusty room on the building’s second floor, where, illuminated by sunlight filtering through a filthy window, stacks of folders lay toppled by their own height and strewn about in unequal piles. "We have," Abady noted, "seventeen more rooms like this in our branches across the country."
A typical case involved an elderly woman named Maha Fattah Karah, whom they summoned to speak with me. Shrouded in black purdah, she settled into a chair in Abady’s office and in animated Arabic (translated for my benefit by the poet Hasan) began her story. In the 1980’s, her husband had fled to Iran to avoid arrest by Baathists, who claimed that he had been "unfaithful" to the regime. The party then confiscated Maha’s home and belongings, throwing her into the street with her three children. A few years later, Baathists arrested her eldest son on the same charge of unfaithfulness and executed him—taking pains, Maha noted, to charge her for the price of the bullet. Hearing about his son’s death, Maha’s husband returned to Iraq, only to be seized by security agents, imprisoned for five years, and executed. He was buried in a graveyard, but the regime forbade Maha or her surviving children to visit it.
At this point, the woman became so shaken that Abady motioned me to stop questioning her. Rising from her chair, she stretched out her palms and began to plead. "I look to America," she sobbed. "I ask America to help me. I ask America not to forget me." Then, supported by two young men, she turned and left.
BABADY'S OFFICE had by now become crowded with men. When I asked about mass graves, a murmur passed among them. According to one of them, a doctor named Abdul Hadj Mushtak, the group had discovered three huge burial sites just south of Baghdad, each containing between 14,000 and 17,000 skeletons. "Iraqis knew generally where these places were, but not exactly," Mushtak recalled. "Our investigators found them and alerted the U.S. authorities."
The story was taken up by Fadel Abbas Kazen, a lawyer who was one of the first on the scene at a killing field near the village of Emam Baker bin Ali. "Bones and skeletal remains lay just under the surface of the earth," he told me. "I watched as people began digging up bodies, some of them with clothing still hanging from the bones. Some people had been killed before being buried, but some had been buried alive." In some cases death had come so unexpectedly that women who had gone to fetch water from a nearby river were buried with basins still clutched in their hands. "Behind a nearby police station, we found another grave containing fifteen more bodies," Fadel continued. In the following days, he oversaw the reburial of some 670 skeletons. "In a thousand years, there have been few tyrants like Saddam Hussein," the lawyer finished, fingering his prayer beads.
I heard this refrain numerous times in Iraq: Saddam’s evil was in a category of its own. Because his regime lasted 35 years, because Iraq is a relatively small nation, because he was so open and boastful about his tyranny—and because the outside world seemed so ready to ignore his crimes—there seemed no way for Iraqis to escape his grasp. "I have lived my entire life with that man in power," said Rand Matti Petros, the twenty-six year-old manager of an Internet cafE9 in Baghdad. "I wake up each morning terrified that I’ve been dreaming and he’s not really gone."
The painter Rassim described to me how the mere act of talking with foreigners at an art exhibition could result in being hauled away for hours of questioning by the dread Mukhabarat secret police. (A sculptor by the name of Haider Wady related that he had had to fend off demands from the Mukhabarat to procure foreign women for them to "date.") Mushtak recalled how his teenage son had once blurted, "I hate Saddam Hussein!" to a group of close friends, only to find himself arrested a few hours later. The police demanded a million Iraqi dinars to free him, and then 200,000 more. "My wife and I never discussed politics in front of our children," he told me. "We never knew when one might accidentally reveal something to an informer."
A few people I met had suffered worse and lived to tell about it. One was a former high-ranking Shiite cleric whom I will call Ahmed. In the late 1990’s, accused by the Baathists of collaborating with anti-government Shiite groups in Europe, he was arrested and imprisoned for several years. In prison he underwent torture. "My hands were tied behind my back and I was hoisted off the ground, sometimes for as long as three days." He went on to describe how his captors shocked him with electric wires charged by a hand-turned military generator and beat him with thick rubber cables. Ahmed was now a broken man: the right side of his body had lost much of its feeling and his right leg, withered by disease contracted in prison, was no thicker than a man’s arm. Growing more agitated as he concluded his story, he confessed that the greatest damage from the torture was spiritual, that "it made me question my faith. Today, I am an atheist."
STORIES LIKE these, defining the reality of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, made me begin to wonder how Iraqis were dealing with the fact that many outsiders seemed to question the value of their country’s liberation. Among those I talked to, the prevalent reaction was sheer disbelief. "If they had lived for five minutes under Saddam they wouldn’t think like this," expostulated an Iraqi translator for the U.S. military. Yet right in Baghdad itself there were quite a few such people: journalists, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), peace activists, and others who seemed to ignore the record of Saddam’s crimes as they vented their anger against the war.
I met "humanitarian workers" in Baghdad who, even as they decried the U.S. "occupation" of the country, would fall into an embarrassed silence when I mentioned Saddam’s atrocities, and "peace activists" who suggested that the terrible image the world has of Saddam Hussein was largely the creation of "U.S. propaganda." One Dutch photographer argued that Saddam’s attack on Iran was no worse than "America’s invasion of Vietnam" and that Baath-party members were mostly "guys just looking for jobs." When I tried to describe to a worker for a Canadian NGO some of the findings of the human-rights association, he shrugged and waggled his hand as if to say, "Yeah, yeah, we’ve heard all this before." Impatiently, he burst out: "Yours is the real rogue nation."
I asked Hasan what he thought of the seemingly worldwide resistance to acknowledging the horrible reality of Saddam Hussein’s crimes. He began by reminding me that some Iraqis practiced their own form of denial: for the most part, these were small-business owners, older artists, and intellectuals who, while not actively collaborating with the Baathists, had nevertheless thrived on their support. (I had encountered a number of such individuals myself.) Then he turned for wisdom to Shakespeare. "People who ‘forget’ about Saddam are like Gertrude in Hamlet. She chose to ‘forget’ about the murder of her husband to get on with her life, and encouraged her son to do the same. But the voices of the dead will not be silent. Like the ghost of Hamlet’s father, they will not rest until some sort of justice is brought to Iraq."
Justice: ask an Iraqi and you will be told that, along with freedom and stability, justice is the third reason why America needs not only to be in Iraq but to stay there. Because of U.S. power, Iraqis already enjoy an independent judiciary and a police force no longer made up of thugs and gangsters. Though Saddam himself remains uncaught, the continued presence of coalition troops is a pledge that his henchmen and fedayeen will not escape unpunished or fall into the hands of a vengeful mob but will face the just retribution of law. It is by means such as these, my interlocutors urged upon me, that Washington has given the Iraqi people, and perhaps the Middle East as a whole, something they never possessed before—a future. "There are no barriers for us now," a young Iraqi said to me gleefully.
That is not true, of course; there are barriers aplenty. The work of reconstruction—political, social, and cultural no less than physical—is gargantuan, long-term, and beset with peril. But increasing its difficulty is the historical and moral amnesia exhibited by the anti-war camp toward the crimes of Saddam Hussein.A0Castigating the United States rather than the tyrant it deposed, refusing to acknowledge the great good our nation has accomplished, these peace activists, Western politicians, international journalists, and intellectuals threaten the rebirth of the country for whose fate they profess to care.
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quote: I met "humanitarian workers" in Baghdad who, even as they decried the U.S. "occupation" of the country, would fall into an embarrassed silence when I mentioned Saddam’s atrocities, and "peace activists" who suggested that the terrible image the world has of Saddam Hussein was largely the creation of "U.S. propaganda." One Dutch photographer argued that Saddam’s attack on Iran was no worse than "America’s invasion of Vietnam" and that Baath-party members were mostly "guys just looking for jobs." When I tried to describe to a worker for a Canadian NGO some of the findings of the human-rights association, he shrugged and waggled his hand as if to say, "Yeah, yeah, we’ve heard all this before." Impatiently, he burst out: "Yours is the real rogue nation."
Remind you of anyone?
:lol:
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/12/07/wirq07.xmlReveREVEALED: THE IRAQI COLONEL WHO TOLD MI6 THAT SADDAM COULD LAUNCH WMD WITHIN 45 MINUTES By Con Coughlin An Iraqi colonel who commanded a front-line unit during the build-up to the war in Iraq has revealed how he passed top secret information to British intelligence warning that Saddam Hussein had deployed weapons of mass destruction that could be used on the battlefield against coalition troops in less than 45 minutes. Lt-Col al-Dabbagh, 40, who was the head of an Iraqi air defence unit in the western desert, said that cases containing WMD warheads were delivered to front-line units, including his own, towards the end of last year. He said they were to be used by Saddam's Fedayeen paramilitaries and units of the Special Republican Guard when the war with coalition troops reached "a critical stage". The containers, which came from a number of factories on the outskirts of Baghdad, were delivered to the army by the Fedayeen and were distributed to the front-line units under cover of darkness. In an exclusive interview with the Telegraph, Col al-Dabbagh said that he believed he was the source of the British Government's controversial claim, published in September last year in the intelligence dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, that Saddam could launch WMD within 45 minutes. "I am the one responsible for providing this information," said the colonel, who is now working as an adviser to Iraq's Governing Council. He also insisted that the information contained in the dossier relating to Saddam's battlefield WMD capability was correct. "It is 100 per cent accurate," he said after reading the relevant passage. The devices, which were known by Iraqi officers as "the secret weapon", were made in Iraq and designed to be launched by hand-held rocket-propelled grenades. They could also have been launched sooner than the 45-minutes claimed in the dossier. "Forget 45 minutes," said Col al-Dabbagh "we could have fired these within half-an-hour." Local commanders were told that they could use the weapons only on the personal orders of Saddam. "We were told that when the war came we would only have a short time to use everything we had to defend ourselves, including the secret weapon," he said. The only reason that these weapons were not used, said Col al-Dabbagh, was because the bulk of the Iraqi army did not want to fight for Saddam. "The West should thank God that the Iraqi army decided not to fight," he said. "If the army had fought for Saddam Hussein and used these weapons there would have been terrible consequences." Col al-Dabbagh, who was recalled to Baghdad to work at Iraq's air defence headquarters during the war itself, believes that the WMD have been hidden at secret locations by the Fedayeen and are still in Iraq. "Only when Saddam is caught will people talk about these weapons," he said. During the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6, said that the information contained in the intelligence dossier relating to the 45-minute claim had come from a single "established and reliable" source serving in the Iraqi armed forces. Privately British intelligence officers have claimed that they believe the original source was killed during the war. Dr Kelly killed himself last July after it was revealed that he was the source of a BBC radio report claiming that the Labour Government had included the 45-minute claim against the wishes of MI6 to "sex up" the intelligence dossier. Col al-Dabbagh, who spied for the Iraqi National Accord (INA), a London-based exile group, for several years before the war, said, however, that he provided several reports to British intelligence on Saddam's plans to deploy WMD from early 2002 onwards. The INA, which was made up of retired and serving Iraqi officers and Ba'ath party officials, is known to have enjoyed a close relationship with MI6 and America's Central Intelligence Agency. Dr Ayad Allawi, the head of the INA who is now a prominent member of the Governing Council in Baghdad, confirmed that he had passed Col al-Dabbagh's reports on Saddam's WMD to both British and American intelligence officers "sometime in the spring and summer of 2002". Apart from providing intelligence on Saddam's WMD programme, Col al-Dabbagh also provided details of Iraq's troop and air defence deployments before the war. Although he gave details of Iraq's battlefield WMD capability, he said that he had no knowledge of any plans by Saddam to use missiles to attack British bases in Cyprus and other Nato targets. In the build-up to the conflict, Tony Blair was criticised by intelligence officials for giving the impression that Saddam had developed ballistic missiles that could carry WMD warheads and hit targets such as Israel and Britain's military bases in Cyprus. But Col al-Dabbagh said that he doubted that Iraq under Saddam had this capability. "I know nothing about this. My information was only about what we could do on the battlefield." Col al-Dabbagh, who received two death threats from Saddam loyalists days after his interview with the Telegraph, said that he was willing to travel to London to give evidence to the Hutton inquiry. "I was there and I knew what Saddam was doing before the war," he said. An official close to the Hutton inquiry said: "What Mr Dabbagh has to say sounds very interesting and it is certainly new evidence that we will want to look at."
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quote: Originally posted by MisterJLA: quote: I met "humanitarian workers" in Baghdad who, even as they decried the U.S. "occupation" of the country, would fall into an embarrassed silence when I mentioned Saddam’s atrocities, and "peace activists" who suggested that the terrible image the world has of Saddam Hussein was largely the creation of "U.S. propaganda." One Dutch photographer argued that Saddam’s attack on Iran was no worse than "America’s invasion of Vietnam" and that Baath-party members were mostly "guys just looking for jobs." When I tried to describe to a worker for a Canadian NGO some of the findings of the human-rights association, he shrugged and waggled his hand as if to say, "Yeah, yeah, we’ve heard all this before." Impatiently, he burst out: "Yours is the real rogue nation."
Remind you of anyone?
:lol:
It's great to hate the United States.
But it just seems so much more logical to hate the countries that are committing genocide and real opression, rather than the U.S. For all its faults, the U.S. provides humanitarian aid and a lot of other good in the world. Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, Germany and Japan have all benefitted from America's "rogue"-ish unilateralism. If not for U.S. unilateralism, a few million more people would have been dead in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere.
Indonesia and Mexico as well have received HUGE financial bailouts from the U.S. As well as huge amounts of foreign aid to virtually all of the third world.
I can't help thinking how supremely ungrateful so many nations of the world are to the U.S.
No matter how much the U.S. does, the charge can always be made that it's not enough.
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Oops, my bad. Duplicate post. ![[gulp!]](gulp.gif)
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"Hey this is PCG342's bro..." 15000+ posts
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"I can't help thinking how supremely ungrateful so many nations of the world are to the U.S."
Not to mention some of its own citizens...
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I found this article in The Iraq War Reader by Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf. Read the part about the promotion of Democracy and Oil. quote:
Deciphering the Bush Administration's motives by Michael T. Klare The United States is about to go to war with Iraq. As of this writing, there are 60,000 U.S. troops already deployed in the area around Iraq, and another 75,000 or so are on their way to the combat zone. Weapons inspectors have found a dozen warheads, designed to carry chemical weapons. Even before this discovery, senior U.S. officials were insisting that Saddam was not cooperating with the United Nations and had to be removed by force. Hence, there does not seem to be any way to stop this war, unless Saddam Hussein is overthrown by members of the Iraqi military or is persuaded to abdicate his position and flee the country.
It is impossible at this point to foresee the outcome of this war. Under the most optimistic scenarios--the ones advanced by proponents of the war--Iraqi forces will put up only token resistance and American forces will quickly capture Baghdad and remove Saddam Hussein from office (by killing him or placing him under arrest). This scenario further assumes that the Iraqis will decline to use their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or will be prevented from doing so by U.S. military action; that civilian casualties will be kept low and that most Iraqis will welcome their "liberation" from Saddam; that a new, pro-U.S. government will quickly and easily be put into place; that fighting between competing ethnic factions will be limited and easily brought under control; that anti-American protests in other Muslim countries will not get out of hand; and that American forces will be withdrawn after a relatively short occupation period of six months to a year.
It is not difficult, however, to imagine less optimistic scenarios. In these scenarios, the Iraqis could put up stiff resistance and conduct house-to-house fighting in Baghdad, thereby producing significant U.S. casualties and leading, in turn, to heavy U.S. air and missile strikes on populated areas, resulting in high civilian casualties. Under these scenarios, the Iraqis will use their chemical and biological weapons in a final spasm of self-destruction, producing untold civilian and combatant casualties. The surviving Iraqis will turn against their American "liberators," resulting in constant sniping and acts of terrorism. The Kurds and Shiites and Sunnis will fight over the spoils of war, producing widespread carnage and trapping U.S. forces in the middle. American troops will remain in Iraq for a generation, or more, producing hatred and resistance throughout the Muslim world and increased levels of terrorism elsewhere.
Which scenario will prevail? Nobody can be certain at this point. Those who favor a war with Iraq tend to believe that Iraqi resistance will be light and that the rest of the optimistic scenario will fall into place. But no one can guarantee that any of this will come to pass, and there are many experts who believe that the likelihood of things going awry are very great. For example, the CIA has indicated that Iraq is most likely to use its WMD in the event that Iraq is attacked and defeat appears likely. In weighing the relative merits of going to war with Iraq, therefore, one should reckon on the worst possible outcome, not the best. One must ask: are the purported benefits of war so great as to outweigh all of the possible negative repercussions?
And this leads to the most fundamental question of all: WHY are we going to war? What is really motivating President Bush and his senior advisers to incur these enormous risks?
In their public pronouncements, President Bush and his associates have advanced three reasons for going to war with Iraq and ousting Saddam Hussein: (1) to eliminate Saddam's WMD arsenals; (2) to diminish the threat of international terrorism; and (3) to promote democracy in Iraq and the surrounding areas.
These are, indeed, powerful motives for going to war. But are they genuine? Is this what is really driving the rush to war? To answer this, we need to examine each motive in turn. In doing so, moreover, it is necessary to keep in mind that the United States cannot do everything. If we commit hundreds of thousands of American troops and hundreds of billions of dollars to the conquest, occupation, and reconstruction of Iraq, we cannot easily do the same in other countries--we simply don't have the resources to invade and occupy every country that poses a hypothetical threat to the United States or is deserving of regime change. So a decision to attack Iraq means a decision to refrain from other actions that might also be important for U.S. security or the good of the world.
(1) Eliminating weapons of mass destruction: The reason most often given by the administration for going to war with Iraq is to reduce the risk of a WMD attack on the United States. To be sure, a significant WMD attack on the United States would be a terrible disaster, and it is appropriate for the President of the United States to take effective and vigorous action to prevent this from happening. If this is, in fact, Bush's primary concern, then one would imagine that he would pay the greatest attention to the greatest threat of WMD usage against the United States, and deploy available U.S. resources--troops, dollars, and diplomacy--accordingly. But is this what Bush is actually doing? The answer is no. Anyone who takes the trouble to examine the global WMD proliferation threat closely and to gauge the relative likelihood of various WMD scenarios would have to conclude that the greatest threat of WMD usage against the United States at the present time comes from North Korea and Pakistan, not Iraq.
North Korea and Pakistan pose a greater WMD threat to the United States than Iraq for several reasons. First of all, they both possess much bigger WMD arsenals. Pakistan is known to possess several dozen nuclear warheads along with missiles and planes capable of delivering them hundreds of miles away; it is also suspected of having developed chemical weapons. North Korea is thought to possess sufficient plutonium to produce one to two nuclear devices along with the capacity to manufacture several more; it also has a large chemical weapons stockpile and a formidable array of ballistic missiles. Iraq, by contrast, possesses no nuclear weapons today and is thought to be several years away from producing one, even under the best of circumstances. Iraq may possess some chemical and biological weapons and a dozen or so Scud-type missiles that were hidden at the end of the 1991 Gulf war, but it is not known whether any of these items are still in working order and available for military use. Equally important is the question of intention: how likely are these countries to actually use their WMD munitions? Nobody can answer this with any degree of certainty, of course. But there are a few things that can be said.
To begin with, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has publicly stated that he was prepared to employ nuclear weapons against India last year when New Delhi massed its forces on Pakistan's border and threatened to attack unless Pakistan curbed the activities of Islamic militants in Kashmir. This does not mean that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons against the United States, but it does indicate a readiness to employ such weapons as an instrument of war; it is also easy to imagine a scenario in which someone else comes to power who is far more anti-American than Musharraf.
Just as worrisome is the fact that the North Koreans have declared that they would consider any move by the United States and the UN to impose economic sanctions on North Korea as punishment for its pursuit of nuclear weapons as an act of war, to which they would respond accordingly, turning the United States into a "sea of fire." Again, this does not mean that they would actually choose to use their nuclear weapons, but it is not hard to imagine a scenario in which war breaks out and the North Koreans use their WMD in a desperate bid to stave off defeat.
On the other hand, the CIA has concluded that Saddam Hussein will not choose to use his country's WMD capabilities against the United States so long as his regime remains intact; it is only in the case of imminent U.S. conquest of Baghdad that he might be tempted to use these weapons.
The Bush administration has also indicated that war with Iraq is justified in order to prevent Iraq from providing WMD to anti-American terrorists. The transfer of WMD technology to terrorist groups is a genuine concern--but it is in Pakistan where the greatest threat of such transference exists, not Iraq. In Pakistan, many senior military officers are known to harbor great sympathy for Kashmiri militants and other extremist Islamic movements; with anti-Americanism intensifying throughout the region, it is not hard to imagine these officers providing the militants with some of Pakistan's WMD weapons and technology. On the other hand, the current leadership in Iraq has no such ties with Islamic extremists; on the contrary, Saddam has been a life-long enemy of the militant Islamists and they view him in an equally hostile manner.
It follows from all this that a policy aimed at protecting the United States from WMD attacks would identify Pakistan and North Korea as the leading perils, and put Iraq in a rather distant third place. But this is not, of course, what the administration is doing. Instead, it has minimized the threat from Pakistan and North Korea and focused almost exclusively on the threat from Iraq. It is clear, then, that protecting the United States from WMD attack is not the primary justification for invading Iraq; if it were, we would be talking about an assault on Pakistan and/or North Korea, not Iraq.
(2) Combating terrorism: The administration has argued at great length that an invasion of Iraq and the ouster of Saddam Hussein would constitute the culmination of and the greatest success in the war against terrorism. Why this is so has never been made entirely clear, but it is said that Saddam's hostility toward the United States somehow sustains and invigorates the terrorist threat to this country. It follows, therefore, that the elimination of Saddam would result in a great defeat for international terrorism and greatly weaken its capacity to attack the United States.
Were any of this true, an invasion of Iraq might make sense from an anti-terrorism point of view. But there simply is no evidence that this is the case; if anything, the opposite is true. From what we know of Al Qaeda and other such organizations, the objective of Islamic extremists is to overthrow any government in the Islamic world that does not adhere to a fundamentalist version of Islam and replace it with one that does. The Baathist regime in Iraq does not qualify as such a regime; thus, under Al Qaeda doctrine, it must be swept away, along with the equally deficient governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. If follows from this that a U.S. effort to oust Saddam Hussein and replace his regime with another secular government--this one kept in place by American military power--will not diminish the wrath of Islamic extremists but rather fuel it.
In addressing this matter, moreover, it is necessary to keep the Israeli-Palestinian struggle in mind. For most Arab Muslims, whatever their views of Saddam Hussein, the United States is a hypocritical power because it tolerates (or even supports) the use of state terror by Israel against the Palestinians while making war against Baghdad for the same sort of behavior. It is this perception that is fueling the anti-American current now running through the Muslim world. An American invasion of Iraq will not quiet that current, but excite it. It is thus exceedingly difficult to see how a U.S. invasion of Iraq will produce a stunning victory in the war against terrorism; if anything, it will trigger a new round of anti-American violence. Hence, it is very difficult to conclude that the administration is motivated by anti-terrorism in seeking to topple Hussein.
(3) The promotion of democracy: The ouster of Saddam Hussein, it is claimed, will clear the space for the Iraqi people (under American guidance, of course) to establish a truly democratic government and serve as a beacon and inspiration for the spread of democracy throughout the Islamic world, which is said to be sadly deficient in this respect. Certainly, the spread of democracy to the Islamic world would be a good thing, and should be encouraged. But is there any reason to believe that the administration is motivated by a desire to spread democracy in its rush to war with Iraq?
There are several reasons to doubt this. First of all, many of the top leaders of the current administration, particularly Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, were completely happy to embrace the Saddam Hussein dictatorship in the 1980s when Iraq was the enemy of our enemy (that is, Iran) and thus considered our de facto friend. Under the so-called "tilt" toward Iraq, the Reagan-Bush administration decided to assist Iraq in its war against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. As part of this policy, Reagan removed Iraq from the list of countries that support terrorism, thus permitting the provision of billions of dollars' worth of agricultural credits and other forms of assistance to Hussein. The bearer of this good news was none other than Donald Rumsfeld, who traveled to Baghdad and met with Hussein in December 1983 as a special representative of President Reagan. At the same time, the Department of Defense, then headed by Dick Cheney, provided Iraq with secret satellite data on Iranian military positions. This information was provided to Saddam even though U.S. leaders were informed by a senior State Department official on November 1, 1983 that the Iraqis were using chemical weapons against the Iranians "almost daily," and were aware that U.S. satellite data could be used by Baghdad to pinpoint CW attacks on Iranian positions. Not once did Mssrs. Rumsfeld and Cheney speak out against Iraqi CW use or suggest that the United States discontinue its support of the Hussein dictatorship during this period. So there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the current leadership has a principled objection to dictatorial rule in Iraq--it is only when Saddam is threatening us instead of our enemies that they care about his tyrannical behavior.
There is another reason to be skeptical about the Bush administration's commitment to democracy in this part of the world, and that is the fact that the administration has developed close relationships with a number of other dictatorial or authoritarian regimes in the area. Most notably, the United States had developed close ties with the post-Soviet dictatorships in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Each of these countries is ruled by a Stalinist dictator who once served as a loyal agent of the Soviet empire: Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan. Only slightly less odious than Saddam Hussein, these tyrants have been welcomed to the White House and showered with American aid and support. And there certainly is nothing even remotely democratic about Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, two of America's other close allies in the region.
So it is hard to believe that the Bush administration is motivated by a love of democracy, when it has been so quick to embrace patently undemocratic regimes that have agreed to do its bidding. So, if concern over WMD proliferation, or the reduction of terrorism, or a love of democracy do not explain the administration's determination to oust Saddam Hussein, what does?
I believe that the answer is a combination of three factors, all related to the pursuit of oil and the preservation of America's status as the paramount world power. Ever since the end of the cold war, American policymakers (whether Democratic or Republican) have sought to preserve America's "sole superpower" status and to prevent the rise of a "peer competitor" that could challenge U.S. paramountcy on anything approaching equal terms. At the same time, American leaders have become increasingly concerned over the country's growing dependence on imported oil, especially oil from the Persian Gulf. The United States now relies on imported oil for 55% of its requirements, and this percentage is expected to rise to 65% in 2020 and keep growing thereafter. This dependency is the "Achilles heel" for American power: unless Persian Gulf oil can be kept under American control, our ability to remain the dominant world power would be put into question.
These concerns undergird the three motives for a U.S. invasion of Iraq. The first derives from America's own dependence on Persian Gulf oil and from the principle, formally enshrined in the Carter Doctrine, that the United States will not permit a hostile state from ever coming into a position where it can threaten America's access to the Gulf. The second is the pivotal role played by the Persian Gulf in supplying oil to the rest of the world: whoever controls the Gulf automatically maintains a stranglehold on the global economy, and the Bush administration wants that to be the United States and no one else. And the third is anxiety about the future availability of oil: the United States is becoming increasingly dependent on Saudi Arabia to supply its imported petroleum, and Washington is desperate to find an alternative to Saudi Arabia should it ever be the case that access to that country is curtailed--and the only country in the world with large enough reserves to compensate for the loss of Saudi Arabia is Iraq.
Let us examine each of these three factors in turn.
First, on U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil and the Carter Doctrine. Ever since World War II, when American policymakers first acknowledged that the United States would someday become dependent on Middle Eastern petroleum, it has been American policy to ensure that the United States would always have unrestrained access to Persian Gulf oil. At first, the United States relied on Great Britain to protect American access to the Gulf, and then, when Britain pulled out of the area in 1971, the U.S. chose to rely on the Shah of Iran. But when, in 1979, the Shah was overthrown by Islamic militants loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini, Washington decided that it would have to assume responsibility on its own to protect the oil flow. The result was the Carter Doctrine of January 23, 1980, which states that unrestricted access to Persian Gulf is a vital interest of the United States and that, in protection of that interest, the United States will employ "any means necessary, including military force."
This principle was first invoked in 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian gunboats fired on Kuwaiti oil tankers and the U.S. Navy began escorting Kuwaiti tankers through the Gulf. It was next invoked in August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and posed an implied threat to Saudi Arabia. President Bush the elder responded to that threat by driving the Iraqis out of Kuwait, in Operation Desert Storm; he did not, however, continue the war into Iraq proper and remove Saddam Hussein himself. Instead, the U.S. engaged in the "containment" of Iraq, entailing an air and sea blockade.
Now, President Bush the younger seeks to abandon containment and pick up Operation Desert Storm where it left off in 1991. The reason being given for this is that Saddam is making more progress in the development of WMD, but the underlying principle is still the Carter Doctrine: Iraq under Saddam poses an implied threat to U.S. access to Persian Gulf oil, and so must be removed. As noted by Vice President Dick Cheney on August 26, 2002, in his important speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, "Armed with these weapons of terror and a seat at the top of 10% of the world's oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies, directly threaten America's friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail." Stripped to its essence, this is a direct invocation of the Carter Doctrine.
To underscore this, it is useful to compare Cheney's VFW speech to his comments 12 years earlier, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, before the Senate Armed Services Committee: "Iraq controlled 10% of the world's reserves prior to the invasion of Kuwait. Once Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, he doubled that to approximately 20% of the world's known oil reserves.... Once he acquired Kuwait and deployed an army as large as the one he possesses [on the border of Saudi Arabia], he was clearly in a position to dictate the future of worldwide energy policy, and that gave him a stranglehold on our economy and on that of most of the other nations of the world as well." The atmospherics may have changed since 1990, but we are still dealing with the Carter Doctrine: Saddam must be removed because of the potential threat he poses to the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. and its allies.
The second administration objective springs from the language employed by Cheney in his 1990 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee: whoever controls the flow of Persian Gulf oil has a "stranglehold" not only on our economy but also "on that of most of that of the other nations of the world as well." This is a powerful image, and perfectly describes the administration's thinking about the Gulf area, except in reverse: by serving as the dominant power in the Gulf, WE maintain a "stranglehold" over the economies of other nations. This gives us extraordinary leverage in world affairs, and explains to some degree why states like Japan, Britain, France, and Germany--states that are even more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than we are--defer to Washington on major international issues (like Iraq) even when they disagree with us.
Maintenance of a stranglehold over Persian Gulf oil is also consistent with the administration's declared goal of attaining permanent military superiority over all other nations. If you read administration statements on U.S. national security policy, you will find that one theme stands out above all others: the United States must prevent any potential rival from ever reaching the point where it could compete with the United States on something resembling equal standing. As articulated in "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (released by President Bush in September 2002), this principle holds that American forces must be "strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."
One way to accomplish this, of course, is to pursue advances in technology that allow the United States to remain ahead of all potential rivals in military systems--which is what the administration hopes to accomplish by adding tens of billions of dollars to the Department of Defense budget. Another way to do this is maintain a stranglehold on the economy of potential rivals, so that they will refrain from challenging us out of fear of being choked to death through the denial of vital energy supplies. Japan and the European countries are already in this vulnerable position, and will remain so for the foreseeable future; but now China is also moving into this position, as it becomes increasingly dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf. Like the U.S., China is running out of oil, and, like us, it has nowhere to go to make up the difference except the Gulf. But since WE control access to the Gulf, and China lacks the power to break our stranglehold, we can keep China in a vulnerable, subordinate position indefinitely. As I see it, then, the removal of Saddam Hussein and his replacement by someone beholden to the United States is a key part of a broader U.S. strategy aimed at assuring permanent American global dominance. Or, as Michael Ignatieff put it in his seminal essay on America's emerging empire, the concentration of so much oil in the Gulf "makes it what a military strategist would call the empire's center of gravity" ("The Burden," The New York Times Magazine, January 5, 2003).
And finally, there is the issue of America's long-term energy dilemma. The problem is as follows: The United States relies on oil to supply about 40% of its energy requirements, more than any other source. At one time, this country relied almost entirely on domestic oil to supply its needs; but our need for oil is growing all the time and our domestic fields--among the oldest in the world--are rapidly being exhausted. So our need for imported oil will grow with each passing year. And the more we turn to foreign sources for our oil, the more we will have to turn to the Persian Gulf, because most of the world's untapped oil--at least two-thirds of it--is located in the Gulf area. We can of course rip up Alaska and extract every drop of oil there, but that would reduce our dependence on imported oil by only about 1-2 percentage points--an insignificant amount. We could also rely for a share of our oil on non-Gulf suppliers like Russia, Venezuela, the Caspian Sea states, and Africa, but they have much less oil than the Persian Gulf countries and they are using it up faster. So, the more you look into the future, the greater will become our dependence on the Gulf.
Now, at the current time, U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil means, in all practical terms, American dependence on Saudi Arabia, because Saudi Arabia has more oil than everyone else--about 250 billion barrels, or one-fourth of world reserves. That gives Saudi Arabia a lot of indirect influence over our economy and our way of life. And, as you know, there are many people in this country who are resentful of the Saudis because of their financial ties to charities linked to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. More to the point, Saudi Arabia is a major backer of OPEC and tends to control the global availability of oil--something that makes American officials very nervous, especially when the Saudis use their power to put pressure on the United States to alter some of its policies, for example with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
For all of these reasons, American leaders would like to reduce America's dependence on Saudi Arabia. But there is only ONE way to permanently reduce America's reliance on Saudi Arabia: by taking over Iraq and using it as an alternative source of petroleum. Iraq is the ONLY country in the world with sufficient reserves to balance Saudi Arabia: at least 112 billion barrels in proven reserves, and as much as 200-300 billion barrels of potential reserves. By occupying Iraq and controlling its government, the United States will solve its long-term oil-dependency dilemma for a decade or more. And this, I believe, is a major consideration in the administration's decisionmaking about Iraq.
It is this set of factors, I believe, that explain the Bush administration's determination to go to war with Iraq--not concern over WMD, terrorism, or the spread of democracy. But having said this, we need to ask: do these objectives, assuming they're the correct ones, still justify a war on Iraq? Some Americans may think so. There are, indeed, advantages to being positioned on the inside of a powerful empire with control over the world's second-largest supply of untapped petroleum. If nothing else, American motorists will be able to afford the gas for their SUVs, vans, and pick-up trucks for another decade, and maybe longer. There will also be lots of jobs in the military and in the military-industrial complex, or as representatives of American multinational corporations (although, with respect to the latter, I would not advise traveling in most of the rest of the world unless accompanied by a small army of bodyguards). But there will also be a price to pay. Empires tend to require the militarization of society, and that will entail putting more people into uniform, one way or another. It will also mean increased spending on war, and reduced spending on education and other domestic needs. It will entail more secrecy and intrusion into our private lives. All of this has to be entered into the equation. And if you ask me, empire is not worth the price.
I'd say some of that is "vastly under reported." quote:
"I can't help thinking how supremely ungrateful so many nations of the world are to the U.S."
Not to mention some of its own citizens...
You have a point, but it's a two way street. They say we're arrogant and ungrateful, which has as much truth to it as what you said.
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Setting aside international policy, American tourists have a reputation for being rude.
I've seen several news stories on this.
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some RKMB'ers are Obsessed with Black People Hmmm? 5000+ posts
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some RKMB'ers are Obsessed with Black People Hmmm? 5000+ posts
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quote: Originally posted by Dave the Wonder Boy: Setting aside international policy, American tourists have a reputation for being rude.
I've seen several news stories on this.
I think a search engine query for "ugly american" would produce something. From my own experience, i can see where this may happen. My brother has been chastized many a time by my dad because whenever they fly back to my dads hometown/country, my brother thinks everyone will be awed by everything from his clothing to hairstyle to gadgets to him being "american" and what-not. I imagine it's the same with many people. Some of us just tend to think we're some amazing spectacle that awes the rest of the world.
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Joined: Nov 2000
Posts: 2,447
2000+ posts
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Does anyone disagree with these statements:
1. "The war was mainly motivated by oil." 2. "We never really cared about bringing Democracy to Iraq."
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Joined: May 2003
Posts: 43,952 Likes: 6
Officially "too old for this shit" 15000+ posts
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Officially "too old for this shit" 15000+ posts
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I would strongly disagree. And have made a number of posts that, I submit, demonstrate why I disagree. I would hazard that the same could be said for "Dave the Wonder boy."
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Joined: May 2003
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We already are 15000+ posts
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We already are 15000+ posts
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Me too G-Money.....I strongly disagree too. That's just gibberish.
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Joined: May 2003
Posts: 32,001 Likes: 1
We already are 15000+ posts
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We already are 15000+ posts
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What I really get a kick out of is alot of these slimeball Democrats are going on and on about how much the rest of the world hates Bush.......well when Clinton was in office they hated him and used to burn pictures of him......Europeans and Arabs HATE ALL AMERICANS!!!
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some RKMB'ers are Obsessed with Black People Hmmm? 5000+ posts
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some RKMB'ers are Obsessed with Black People Hmmm? 5000+ posts
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My kingdom for transcripts of all the message boards I attended right before and during the start of the war where all the bushies were declaring that we should "nuke them all into the stone age", "kill em all" and what not.
How nice to see that after months of fishing, the neocons finally discovered they were bringing democracy to the poor Iraqi's.
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Joined: Nov 2000
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2000+ posts
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Bush doesn't give a shit about bringing democracy to the region. There hasn't been a single president who cared about bringing democracy to the region. If the oil wasn't there, we wouldn't be there. WMD and UN violations aren't justifications, they're execuses.
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Joined: Nov 2000
Posts: 2,447
2000+ posts
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2000+ posts
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quote: I would strongly disagree. And have made a number of posts that, I submit, demonstrate why I disagree. I would hazard that the same could be said for "Dave the Wonder boy."
quote: Me too G-Money.....I strongly disagree too. That's just gibberish.
Read that article I posted above.
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brutally Kamphausened 15000+ posts
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brutally Kamphausened 15000+ posts
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quote: Originally posted by JQ: Does anyone disagree with these statements:
1. "The war was mainly motivated by oil." 2. "We never really cared about bringing Democracy to Iraq."
I'm in complete agreement with G-Man and PJP's responses. Our responses have laid out abundantly that there were larger issues than oil.
More specifically, we get very cheap oil now from Venezuela, Nigeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and a huge amount of cheap oil from Russia. We don't NEED Iraq's oil.
As Bush said in his 1-28-2003 State of the Union address (which I've linked and quoted repeatedly), Iraq's oil and resources "belong to the Iraqi people" and are not bounty of conquest for the United States. Revenue for oil production in Iraq is proposed to pay back SOME of the debt the U.S. incurred from the war and reconstruction, but that is FAR from profiting from the occupation. As I've said prior, if it was about greed and cheap oil, Bush could have just cut a deal with Saddam Hussein, and saved himself the trouble and expense of waging war.
On top of that, gas was about 1.06 a gallon when Bush was inaugurated (at least in my area), and I now pay about 1.47 a gallon. So it wasn't a war to get us cheap oil either.
THE WAR WAS ABOUT A DEFIANT ROGUE NATION THAT DISOBEYED 12 YEARS OF WARNINGS FROM THE U.N., and (as PJP's link above shows, with the inside perspective of Iraq's former head of nuclear weapons development, Dr. Khidir Hamza), it was only a matter of time until Saddam Hussein got nuclear weapons or other WMD's and threatened his neighbors, even WITH sanctions strangling Iraq's economy. I'm glad Saddam was taken out, before one day, unexpectedly and unforseen, he announced joining the North Korea Nuclear Club. North Korea was similarly not seen as a threat, until they suddenly announced they had nuclear weapons.
Finally, I think the goal in Iraq is clearly to plant seeds of democracy in the region. Otherwise, why would we EVER give the Iraqis sovereignty, let alone do so just six short months from now? A lot of people disagree that democracy is possible in Iraq and other Muslim countries, but despite how Bush-bashers are constantly trying to tear down what is being accomplished in Iraq, democracy is still being attempted and expanded in Iraq, with success that is under-reported.
The idea is, if Iraq has a strong democracy, then that puts pressure on Iran, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim nations to make democratic reforms as well. Otherwise, if Iraq prospers as a democracy, people will flock to Iraq from neighboring states, where there are economic opportunities and freedoms not available in their own countries. Maybe a year from now, we'll begin to see that happen.
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