RKMBs Forums .::Important::. Politics and Current Events "It's not about oil or Iraq..."

Quote:

---

Kurds Mark Saddam's '88 Chemical Attack
Tue Mar 16, 1:24 PM ET Add World - AP to My Yahoo!


By MARIAM FAM, Associated Press Writer

HALABJA, Iraq - Clutching pictures of relatives they lost, survivors of Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s 1988 chemical weapons attack gathered in this northern town Tuesday to remember the thousands who died.


AP Photo




Latest headlines:
· Kerry Wins in Ill., Defends Iraq Votes
AP - 15 minutes ago
· Rumsfeld says other countries will deploy troops to Iraq if Spain backs out
AFP - 25 minutes ago
· Iraq Insurgents Shifting to Soft Targets
AP - 39 minutes ago
Special Coverage





They were joined by the top administrator in Iraq (news - web sites), L. Paul Bremer, at a ceremony marking the 16th anniversary of the infamous bombing. The memorial was the first since Saddam was toppled by the U.S.-led coalition and it resonated with references to the war.


"This day reminds us of our grief ... (But) it's also a day of happiness because the dictatorship has collapsed," said Drakshan Kakasheik, who lost her husband, brother and three children, including a 5-month old son who died in her arms.


"We smelled a foul smell and my brother went out and said: 'We're doomed. These are chemical weapons,'" she recalled tearfully.


An estimated 5,000 people were killed and another 10,000 injured by the poisonous bombs Iraqi forces dropped on Halabja on March 16, 1988.


"For those in my country and elsewhere who ... still wonder if the war was worth fighting, I say, 'Come to Halabja,'" Bremer said. "Look in the faces of the survivors here today. See how a peaceful village was turned into a hell overnight by evil."


Bremer said the coalition would establish a $1 million fund for Halabja, where Saddam Hussein's "government turned its own power and might on its own people."


Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of two main Kurdish parties, said the attack on Halabja is proof of the use of "mass destruction arms by the Iraqi dictator."


"I call all those who are not believing in it, 'Please come to Halabja to see how mass destruction arms (were) used,'" he said. "We are now free ... thanks to the coalition forces."


Bremer, surrounded by families clutching photos of relatives they lost, said those behind the attack would be held accountable.


"I can promise you that justice will be done against the men who committed these acts," Bremer said. "At the appropriate time, Saddam Hussein ... and all the other criminals will face justice before the special tribunal."


Bremer was speaking outside the Halabja Monument, built in honor of the victims. He chatted with relatives of those killed and toured the building, looking at photos of disfigured residents and lifeless children piled on top of each other.


In one room, statues replicate scenes from the attack. One shows a man using his own body as a shield to protect his baby. Both were lying dead at a doorstep next to a dead sheep. The names of victims are inscribed in white on the black marble walls of a circular hall.


During the ceremony, Kurdish forces surveyed roads leading to Halabja from atop rolling green hills and squat brick houses. Others manned checkpoints and searched vehicles.


Two suicide bombers killed 109 people at the offices of the two Kurdish parties in Irbil on Feb. 1. A little-known group, Jaish Ansar al-Sunna, claimed responsibility for the attack. Some officials linked the group with Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish extremist movement with alleged ties to al-Qaida.

---

Quote:

---

britneyspearsatemyshorts said:
at least whomod had enough sense to realize he couldnt argue with the facts on that article....

---

Quote:

---

The new Pentagon papers


A high-ranking military officer reveals how Defense Department extremists suppressed information and twisted the truth to drive the country to war.

March 10, 2004 | In July of last year, after just over 20 years of service, I retired as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force. I had served as a communications officer in the field and in acquisition programs, as a speechwriter for the National Security Agency director, and on the Headquarters Air Force and the office of the secretary of defense staffs covering African affairs. I had completed Air Command and Staff College and Navy War College seminar programs, two master's degrees, and everything but my Ph.D. dissertation in world politics at Catholic University. I regarded my military vocation as interesting, rewarding and apolitical. My career started in 1978 with the smooth seduction of a full four-year ROTC scholarship. It ended with 10 months of duty in a strange new country, observing up close and personal a process of decision making for war not sanctioned by the Constitution we had all sworn to uphold. Ben Franklin's comment that the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia had delivered "a republic, madam, if you can keep it" would come to have special meaning.

In the spring of 2002, I was a cynical but willing staff officer, almost two years into my three-year tour at the office of the secretary of defense, undersecretary for policy, sub-Saharan Africa. In April, a call for volunteers went out for the Near East South Asia directorate (NESA). None materialized. By May, the call transmogrified into a posthaste demand for any staff officer, and I was "volunteered" to enter what would be a well-appointed den of iniquity.


The education I would receive there was like an M. Night Shyamalan movie -- intense, fascinating and frightening. While the people were very much alive, I saw a dead philosophy -- Cold War anti-communism and neo-imperialism -- walking the corridors of the Pentagon. It wore the clothing of counterterrorism and spoke the language of a holy war between good and evil. The evil was recognized by the leadership to be resident mainly in the Middle East and articulated by Islamic clerics and radicals. But there were other enemies within, anyone who dared voice any skepticism about their grand plans, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and Gen. Anthony Zinni.

From May 2002 until February 2003, I observed firsthand the formation of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans and watched the latter stages of the neoconservative capture of the policy-intelligence nexus in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. This seizure of the reins of U.S. Middle East policy was directly visible to many of us working in the Near East South Asia policy office, and yet there seemed to be little any of us could do about it.

I saw a narrow and deeply flawed policy favored by some executive appointees in the Pentagon used to manipulate and pressurize the traditional relationship between policymakers in the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies.

I witnessed neoconservative agenda bearers within OSP usurp measured and carefully considered assessments, and through suppression and distortion of intelligence analysis promulgate what were in fact falsehoods to both Congress and the executive office of the president.

While this commandeering of a narrow segment of both intelligence production and American foreign policy matched closely with the well-published desires of the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party, many of us in the Pentagon, conservatives and liberals alike, felt that this agenda, whatever its flaws or merits, had never been openly presented to the American people. Instead, the public story line was a fear-peddling and confusing set of messages, designed to take Congress and the country into a war of executive choice, a war based on false pretenses, and a war one year later Americans do not really understand. That is why I have gone public with my account.

To begin with, I was introduced to Bill Luti, assistant secretary of defense for NESA. A tall, thin, nervously intelligent man, he welcomed me into the fold. I knew little about him. Because he was a recently retired naval captain and now high-level Bush appointee, the common assumption was that he had connections, if not capability. I would later find out that when Dick Cheney was secretary of defense over a decade earlier, Luti was his aide. He had also been a military aide to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich during the Clinton years and had completed his Ph.D. at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. While his Navy career had not granted him flag rank, he had it now and was not shy about comparing his place in the pecking order with various three- and four-star generals and admirals in and out of the Pentagon. Name dropping included references to getting this or that document over to Scooter, or responding to one of Scooter's requests right away. Scooter, I would find out later, was I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the vice president's chief of staff.

Co-workers who had watched the transition from Clintonista to Bushite shared conversations and stories indicating that something deliberate and manipulative was happening to NESA. Key professional personnel, longtime civilian professionals holding the important billets in NESA, were replaced early on during the transition. Longtime officer director Joe McMillan was reassigned to the National Defense University. The director's job in the time of transition was to help bring the newly appointed deputy assistant secretary up to speed, ensure office continuity, act as a resource relating to regional histories and policies, and help identify the best ways to maintain course or to implement change. Removing such a critical continuity factor was not only unusual but also seemed like willful handicapping. It was the first signal of radical change.

At the time, I didn't realize that the expertise on Middle East policy was not only being removed, but was also being exchanged for that from various agenda-bearing think tanks, including the Middle East Media Research Institute, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. Interestingly, the office director billet stayed vacant the whole time I was there. That vacancy and the long-term absence of real regional understanding to inform defense policymakers in the Pentagon explains a great deal about the neoconservative approach on the Middle East and the disastrous mistakes made in Washington and in Iraq in the past two years.

---

Quote:

---

Pg. II

I soon saw the modus operandi of "instant policy" unhampered by debate or experience with the early Bush administration replacement of the civilian head of the Israel, Lebanon and Syria desk office with a young political appointee from the Washington Institute, David Schenker. Word was that the former experienced civilian desk officer tended to be evenhanded toward the policies of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, but there were complaints and he was gone. I met David and chatted with him frequently. He was a smart, serious, hardworking guy, and the proud author of a book on the chances for Palestinian democracy. Country desk officers were rarely political appointees. In my years at the Pentagon, this was the only "political" I knew doing that type of high-stress and low-recognition duty. So eager was the office to have Schenker at the Israel desk, he served for many months as a defense contractor of sorts and only received his "Schedule C" political appointee status months after I arrived.

I learned that there was indeed a preferred ideology for NESA. My first day in the office, a GS-15 career civil servant rather unhappily advised me that if I wanted to be successful here, I'd better remember not to say anything positive about the Palestinians. This belied official U.S. policy of serving as an honest broker for resolution of Israeli and Palestinian security concerns. At that time, there was a great deal of talk about Bush's possible support for a Palestinian state. That the Pentagon could have implemented and, worse, was implementing its own foreign policy had not yet occurred to me.


Throughout the summer, the NESA spaces in one long office on the fourth floor, between the 7th and 8th corridors of D Ring, became more and more crowded. With war talk and planning about Iraq, all kinds of new people were brought in. A politically savvy civilian-clothes-wearing lieutenant colonel named Bill Bruner served as the Iraq desk officer, and he had apparently joined NESA about the time Bill Luti did. I discovered that Bruner, like Luti, had served as a military aide to Speaker Gingrich. Gingrich himself was now conveniently an active member of Bush's Defense Policy Board, which had space immediately below ours on the third floor.

I asked why Bruner wore civilian attire, and was told by others, "He's Chalabi's handler." Chalabi, of course, was Ahmad Chalabi, the president of the Iraqi National Congress, who was the favored exile of the neoconservatives and the source of much of their "intelligence." Bruner himself said he had to attend a lot of meetings downtown in hotels and that explained his suits. Soon, in July, he was joined by another Air Force pilot, a colonel with no discernible political connections, Kevin Jones. I thought of it as a military-civilian partnership, although both were commissioned officers.

Among the other people arriving over the summer of 2002 was Michael Makovsky, a recent MIT graduate who had written his dissertation on Winston Churchill and was going to work on "Iraqi oil issues." He was David Makovsky's younger brother. David was at the time a senior fellow at the Washington Institute and had formerly been an editor of the Jerusalem Post, a pro-Likud newspaper. Mike was quiet and seemed a bit uncomfortable sharing space with us. He soon disappeared into some other part of the operation and I rarely saw him after that.

In late summer, new space was found upstairs on the fifth floor, and the "expanded Iraq desk," now dubbed the "Office of Special Plans," began moving there. And OSP kept expanding.

Another person I observed to appear suddenly was Michael Rubin, another Washington Institute fellow working on Iraq policy. He and Chris Straub, a retired Army officer who had been a Republican staffer for the Senate Intelligence Committee, were eventually assigned to OSP.

John Trigilio, a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, was assigned to handle Iraq intelligence for Luti. Trigilio had been on a one-year career-enhancement tour with the office of the secretary of defense that was to end in August 2002. DIA had offered him routine intelligence positions upon his return from his OSD sabbatical, but none was as interesting as working in August 2002 for Luti. John asked Luti for help in gaining an extension for another year, effectively removing him from the DIA bureaucracy and its professional constraints.

Trigilio and I had hallway debates, as friends. The one I remember most clearly was shortly after President Bush gave his famous "mushroom cloud" speech in Cincinnati in October 2002, asserting that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction as well as ties to "international terrorists," and was working feverishly to develop nuclear weapons with "nuclear holy warriors." I asked John who was feeding the president all the bull about Saddam and the threat he posed us in terms of WMD delivery and his links to terrorists, as none of this was in secret intelligence I had seen in the past years. John insisted that it wasn't an exaggeration, but when pressed to say which actual intelligence reports made these claims, he would only say, "Karen, we have sources that you don't have access to." It was widely felt by those of us in the office not in the neoconservatives' inner circle that these "sources" related to the chummy relationship that Ahmad Chalabi had with both the Office of Special Plans and the office of the vice president.

The newly named director of the OSP, Abram Shulsky, was one of the most senior people sharing our space that summer. Abe, a kindly and gentle man, who would say hello to me in the hallways, seemed to be someone I, as a political science grad student, would have loved to sit with over coffee and discuss the world's problems. I had a clear sense that Abe ranked high in the organization, although ostensibly he was under Luti. Luti was known at times to treat his staff, even senior staff, with disrespect, contempt and derision. He also didn't take kindly to staff officers who had an opinion or viewpoint that was off the neoconservative reservation. But with Shulsky, who didn't speak much at the staff meetings, he was always respectful and deferential. It seemed like Shulsky's real boss was somebody like Douglas Feith or higher.

Doug Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy, was a case study in how not to run a large organization. In late 2001, he held the first all-hands policy meeting at which he discussed for over 15 minutes how many bullets and sub-bullets should be in papers for Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. A year later, in August of 2002, he held another all-hands meeting in the auditorium where he embarrassed everyone with an emotional performance about what it was like to serve Rumsfeld. He blithely informed us that for months he didn't realize Rumsfeld had a daily stand-up meeting with his four undersecretaries. He shared with us the fact that, after he started to attend these meetings, he knew better what Rumsfeld wanted of him. Most military staffers and professional civilians hearing this were incredulous, as was I, to hear of such organizational ignorance lasting so long and shared so openly. Feith's inattention to most policy detail, except that relating to Israel and Iraq, earned him a reputation most foul throughout Policy, with rampant stories of routine signatures that took months to achieve and lost documents. His poor reputation as a manager was not helped by his arrogance. One thing I kept hearing from those defending Feith was that he was "just brilliant." It was curiously like the brainwashed refrain in "The Manchurian Candidate" about the programmed sleeper agent Raymond Shaw, as the "kindest, warmest, bravest, most wonderful human being I've ever known."

---

Quote:

---

Pg. III

I spent time that summer exploring the neoconservative worldview and trying to grasp what was happening inside the Pentagon. I wondered what could explain this rush to war and disregard for real intelligence. Neoconservatives are fairly easy to study, mainly because they are few in number, and they show up at all the same parties. Examining them as individuals, it became clear that almost all have worked together, in and out of government, on national security issues for several decades. The Project for the New American Century and its now famous 1998 manifesto to President Clinton on Iraq is a recent example. But this statement was preceded by one written for Benyamin Netanyahu's Likud Party campaign in Israel in 1996 by neoconservatives Richard Perle, David Wurmser and Douglas Feith titled "A Clean Break: Strategy for Securing the Realm."

David Wurmser is the least known of that trio and an interesting example of the tangled neoconservative web. In 2001, the research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute was assigned to the Pentagon, then moved to the Department of State to work as deputy for the hard-line conservative undersecretary John Bolton, then to the National Security Council, and now is lodged in the office of the vice president. His wife, the prolific Meyrav Wurmser, executive director of the Middle East Media Research Institute, is also a neoconservative team player.


Before the Iraq invasion, many of these same players labored together for literally decades to push a defense strategy that favored military intervention and confrontation with enemies, secret and unconstitutional if need be. Some former officials, such as Richard Perle (an assistant secretary of defense under Reagan) and James Woolsey (CIA director under Clinton), were granted a new lease on life, a renewed gravitas, with positions on President Bush's Defense Policy Board. Others, like Elliott Abrams and Paul Wolfowitz, had apparently overcome previous negative associations from an Iran-Contra conviction for lying to the Congress and for utterly miscalculating the strength of the Soviet Union in a politically driven report to the CIA.

Neoconservatives march as one phalanx in parallel opposition to those they hate. In the early winter of 2002, a co-worker U.S. Navy captain and I were discussing the service being rendered by Colin Powell at the time, and we were told by the neoconservative political appointee David Schenker that "the best service Powell could offer would be to quit right now." I was present at a staff meeting when Bill Luti called Marine Gen. and former Chief of Central Command Anthony Zinni a "traitor," because Zinni had publicly expressed reservations about the rush to war.

After August 2002, the Office of Special Plans established its own rhythm and cadence separate from the non-politically minded professionals covering the rest of the region. While often accused of creating intelligence, I saw only two apparent products of this office: war planning guidance for Rumsfeld, presumably impacting Central Command, and talking points on Iraq, WMD and terrorism. These internal talking points seemed to be a mélange crafted from obvious past observation and intelligence bits and pieces of dubious origin. They were propagandistic in style, and all desk officers were ordered to use them verbatim in the preparation of any material prepared for higher-ups and people outside the Pentagon. The talking points included statements about Saddam Hussein's proclivity for using chemical weapons against his own citizens and neighbors, his existing relations with terrorists based on a member of al-Qaida reportedly receiving medical care in Baghdad, his widely publicized aid to the Palestinians, and general indications of an aggressive viability in Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program and his ongoing efforts to use them against his neighbors or give them to al-Qaida style groups. The talking points said he was threatening his neighbors and was a serious threat to the U.S., too.

I suspected, from reading Charles Krauthammer, a neoconservative columnist for the Washington Post, and the Weekly Standard, and hearing a Cheney speech or two, that these talking points left the building on occasion. Both OSP functions duplicated other parts of the Pentagon. The facts we should have used to base our papers on were already being produced by the intelligence agencies, and the war planning was already done by the combatant command staff with some help from the Joint Staff. Instead of developing defense policy alternatives and advice, OSP was used to manufacture propaganda for internal and external use, and pseudo war planning.

As a result of my duties as the North Africa desk officer, I became acquainted with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) support staff for NESA. Every policy regional director was served by a senior executive intelligence professional from DIA, along with a professional intelligence staff. This staff channeled DIA products, accepted tasks for DIA, and in the past had been seen as a valued member of the regional teams. However, as the war approached, this type of relationship with the Defense Intelligence Agency crumbled.

Even the most casual observer could note the tension and even animosity between "Wild Bill" Luti (as we came to refer to our boss) and Bruce Hardcastle, our defense intelligence officer (DIO). Certainly, there were stylistic and personality differences. Hardcastle, like most senior intelligence officers I knew, was serious, reserved, deliberate, and went to great lengths to achieve precision and accuracy in his speech and writing. Luti was the kind of guy who, in staff meetings and in conversations, would jump from grand theory to administrative minutiae with nary a blink or a fleeting shadow of self-awareness.

I discovered that Luti and possibly others within OSP were dissatisfied with Hardcastle's briefings, in particular with the aspects relating to WMD and terrorism. I was not clear exactly what those concerns were, but I came to understand that the DIA briefing did not match what OSP was claiming about Iraq's WMD capabilities and terrorist activities. I learned that shortly before I arrived there had been an incident in NESA where Hardcastle's presence and briefing at a bilateral meeting had been nixed abruptly by Luti. The story circulating among the desk officers was "a last-minute cancellation" of the DIO presentation. Hardcastle's intelligence briefing was replaced with one prepared by another Policy office that worked nonproliferation issues. While this alternative briefing relied on intelligence produced by DIO and elsewhere, it was not a product of the DIA or CIA community, but instead was an OSD Policy "branded" product -- and so were its conclusions. The message sent by Policy appointees and well understood by staff officers and the defense intelligence community was that senior appointed civilians were willing to exclude or marginalize intelligence products that did not fit the agenda.

---

Quote:

---

Pg. IV

Staff officers would always request OSP's most current Iraq, WMD and terrorism talking points. On occasion, these weren't available in an approved form and awaited Shulsky's approval. The talking points were a series of bulleted statements, written persuasively and in a convincing way, and superficially they seemed reasonable and rational. Saddam Hussein had gassed his neighbors, abused his people, and was continuing in that mode, becoming an imminently dangerous threat to his neighbors and to us -- except that none of his neighbors or Israel felt this was the case. Saddam Hussein had harbored al-Qaida operatives and offered and probably provided them with training facilities -- without mentioning that the suspected facilities were in the U.S./Kurdish-controlled part of Iraq. Saddam Hussein was pursuing and had WMD of the type that could be used by him, in conjunction with al-Qaida and other terrorists, to attack and damage American interests, Americans and America -- except the intelligence didn't really say that. Saddam Hussein had not been seriously weakened by war and sanctions and weekly bombings over the past 12 years, and in fact was plotting to hurt America and support anti-American activities, in part through his carrying on with terrorists -- although here the intelligence said the opposite. His support for the Palestinians and Arafat proved his terrorist connections, and basically, the time to act was now. This was the gist of the talking points, and it remained on message throughout the time I watched the points evolve.

But evolve they did, and the subtle changes I saw from September to late January revealed what the Office of Special Plans was contributing to national security. Two key types of modifications were directed or approved by Shulsky and his team of politicos. First was the deletion of entire references or bullets. The one I remember most specifically is when they dropped the bullet that said one of Saddam's intelligence operatives had met with Mohammad Atta in Prague, supposedly salient proof that Saddam was in part responsible for the 9/11 attack. That claim had lasted through a number of revisions, but after the media reported the claim as unsubstantiated by U.S. intelligence, denied by the Czech government, and that Atta's location had been confirmed by the FBI to be elsewhere, that particular bullet was dropped entirely from our "advice on things to say" to senior Pentagon officials when they met with guests or outsiders.


The other change made to the talking points was along the line of fine-tuning and generalizing. Much of what was there was already so general as to be less than accurate.

Some bullets were softened, particularly statements of Saddam's readiness and capability in the chemical, biological or nuclear arena. Others were altered over time to match more exactly something Bush and Cheney said in recent speeches. One item I never saw in our talking points was a reference to Saddam's purported attempt to buy yellowcake uranium in Niger. The OSP list of crime and evil had included Saddam's attempts to seek fissionable materials or uranium in Africa. This point was written mostly in the present tense and conveniently left off the dates of the last known attempt, sometime in the late 1980s. I was surprised to hear the president's mention of the yellowcake in Niger in his 2003 State of the Union address because that indeed was new and in theory might have represented new intelligence, something that seemed remarkably absent in any of the products provided us by the OSP (although not for lack of trying). After hearing of it, I checked with my old office of Sub-Saharan African Affairs -- and it was news to them, too. It also turned out to be false.

It is interesting today that the "defense" for those who lied or prevaricated about Iraq is to point the finger at the intelligence. But the National Intelligence Estimate, published in September 2002, as remarked upon recently by former CIA Middle East chief Ray McGovern, was an afterthought. It was provoked only after Sens. Bob Graham and Dick Durban noted in August 2002, as Congress was being asked to support a resolution for preemptive war, that no NIE elaborating real threats to the United States had been provided. In fact, it had not been written, but a suitable NIE was dutifully prepared and submitted the very next month. Naturally, this document largely supported most of the outrageous statements already made publicly by Bush, Cheney, Rice and Rumsfeld about the threat Iraq posed to the United States. All the caveats, reservations and dissents made by intelligence were relegated to footnotes and kept from the public. Funny how that worked.

Starting in the fall of 2002 I found a way to vent my frustrations with the neoconservative hijacking of our defense policy. The safe outlet was provided by retired Col. David Hackworth, who agreed to publish my short stories anonymously on his Web site Soldiers for the Truth, under the moniker of "Deep Throat: Insider Notes From the Pentagon." The "deep throat" part was his idea, but I was happy to have a sense that there were folks out there, mostly military, who would be interested in the secretary of defense-sponsored insanity I was witnessing on almost a daily basis. When I was particularly upset, like when I heard Zinni called a "traitor," I wrote about it in articles like this one.

In November, my Insider articles discussed the artificial worlds created by the Pentagon and the stupid naiveté of neocon assumptions about what would happen when we invaded Iraq. I discussed the price of public service, distinguishing between public servants who told the truth and then saw their careers flame out and those "public servants" who did not tell the truth and saw their careers ignite. My December articles became more depressing, discussing the history of the 100 Years' War and "combat lobotomies." There was a painful one titled "Minority Reports" about the necessity but unlikelihood of a Philip Dick sci-fi style "minority report" on Feith-Wolfowitz-Rumsfeld-Cheney's insanely grandiose vision of some future Middle East, with peace, love and democracy brought on through preemptive war and military occupation.

---

Quote:

---

Pg. V

I shared some of my concerns with a civilian who had been remotely acquainted with the Luti-Feith-Perle political clan in his previous work for one of the senior Pentagon witnesses during the Iran-Contra hearings. He told me these guys were engaged in something worse than Iran-Contra. I was curious but he wouldn't tell me anything more. I figured he knew what he was talking about. I thought of him when I read much later about the 2002 and 2003 meetings between Michael Ledeen, Reuel Marc Gerecht and Iranian arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar -- all Iran-Contra figures.

In December 2002, I requested an acceleration of my retirement to the following July. By now, the military was anxiously waiting under the bed for the other shoe to drop amid concerns over troop availability, readiness for an ill-defined mission, and lack of day-after clarity. The neocons were anxiously struggling to get that damn shoe off. That other shoe fell with a thump, as did the regard many of us had held for Colin Powell, on Feb. 5 as the secretary of state capitulated to the neoconservative line in his speech at the United Nations -- a speech not only filled with falsehoods pushed by the neoconservatives but also containing many statements already debunked by intelligence.


War is generally crafted and pursued for political reasons, but the reasons given to the Congress and to the American people for this one were inaccurate and so misleading as to be false. Moreover, they were false by design. Certainly, the neoconservatives never bothered to sell the rest of the country on the real reasons for occupation of Iraq -- more bases from which to flex U.S. muscle with Syria and Iran, and better positioning for the inevitable fall of the regional ruling sheikdoms. Maintaining OPEC on a dollar track and not a euro and fulfilling a half-baked imperial vision also played a role. These more accurate reasons for invading and occupying could have been argued on their merits -- an angry and aggressive U.S. population might indeed have supported the war and occupation for those reasons. But Americans didn't get the chance for an honest debate.

President Bush has now appointed a commission to look at American intelligence capabilities and will report after the election. It will "examine intelligence on weapons of mass destruction and related 21st century threats ... [and] compare what the Iraq Survey Group learns with the information we had prior..." The commission, aside from being modeled on failed rubber stamp commissions of the past and consisting entirely of those selected by the executive branch, specifically excludes an examination of the role of the Office of Special Plans and other executive advisory bodies. If the president or vice president were seriously interested in "getting the truth," they might consider asking for evidence on how intelligence was politicized, misused and manipulated, and whether information from the intelligence community was distorted in order to sway Congress and public opinion in a narrowly conceived neoconservative push for war. Bush says he wants the truth, but it is clear he is no more interested in it today than he was two years ago.

Proving that the truth is indeed the first casualty in war, neoconservative member of the Defense Policy Board Richard Perle called this February for "heads to roll." Perle, agenda setter par excellence, named George Tenet and Defense Intelligence Agency head Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby as guilty of failing to properly inform the president on Iraq and WMD. No doubt, the intelligence community, susceptible to politicization and outdated paradigms, needs reform. The swiftness of the neoconservative casting of blame on the intelligence community and away from themselves should have been fully expected. Perhaps Perle and others sense the grave and growing danger of political storms unleashed by the exposure of neoconservative lies. Meanwhile, Ahmad Chalabi, extravagantly funded by the neocons in the Pentagon to the tune of millions to provide the disinformation, has boasted with remarkable frankness, "We are heroes in error," and, "What was said before is not important."

Now we are told by our president and neoconservative mouthpieces that our sons and daughters, husbands and wives are in Iraq fighting for freedom, for liberty, for justice and American values. This cost is not borne by the children of Wolfowitz, Perle, Rumsfeld and Cheney. Bush's daughters do not pay this price. We are told that intelligence has failed America, and that President Bush is determined to get to the bottom of it. Yet not a single neoconservative appointee has lost his job, and no high official of principle in the administration has formally resigned because of this ill-planned and ill-conceived war and poorly implemented occupation of Iraq.

Will Americans hold U.S. policymakers accountable? Will we return to our roots as a republic, constrained and deliberate, respectful of others? My experience in the Pentagon leading up to the invasion and occupation of Iraq tells me, as Ben Franklin warned, we may have already failed. But if Americans at home are willing to fight -- tenaciously and courageously -- to preserve our republic, we might be able to keep it.


salon.com





- - - - - - - - - - - -

About the writer
Karen Kwiatkowski now lives in western Virginia on a small farm with her family, teaches an American foreign policy class at James Madison University, and writes regularly for militaryweek.com on security and defense issues.

---

Quote:

---

JQ said:
It's amazing how you guys can pick up on Europe's business interests, but "America's always acted in the interest of Democracy." Washington doesn't give a shit about Democracy in the region, or the lives of the people. This whole war has been about control of the region, and at best, maintaining stability in the region for our oil interests.

---

Because the U.S. fought this war at an enormous cost, and it will spend at least 15 to 20 years attempting to break even on any benefit from the war in Iraq.

If we were going to occupy Iraq under our indefinite "protection" for the next 20 or 40 years, then I might be more inclined to agree with your skepticism regarding U.S. policy, and alleged greed, in invading Iraq.

But I still credit Bush with having the courage to defy UN/French/German/Russian obstructionism, for putting out a fire, before it became a 1914 Sarajevo, or a September 1939 Poland, or a 1979 Cambodia, or a December 2002 North Korea. And as has been pointed out, it has already prevented a 2004 or 2005 nuclear Libya.

I actually like you JQ, I think among the liberals who post here, you are among those who most try to weigh the issue and actually discuss it.

But I disagree on this point, and think that whatever the U.S. may have gained in this war, it has sacrificed a relatively small cost (in proportion to other wars) but still precious cost, in lives, and a much greater cost in dollars and diplomatic alienation, because it truly wants to seed democracy in the Middle East, as it did in Eastern Europe at the end of WW I, and in Germany and Japan at the end of WW II.

We tried to respect the U.N. wishes for the last 20 years in the Middle East. As appeasing but ineffectual as that was.

But after 9-11, the price of such acquiescence, just watching the cancer spread, and then having the Muslim world hate us regardless, FOR WORKING WITHIN the U.N. parameters, can be seen. We maintained a limited presence, in compliance with U.N. paramaters, and then the Muslim world hates us for keeping troops there, even in a limited capacity. So if we'd just taken Baghdad in 1991, there would have been no rationalization for 9-11, because our troops would have deposed Saddam in 1991, and American presence on the Arabian peninsula (in Al Qaida's words, infidel Crusaders in "the heart of Islam") would have been long gone, removing the rationalization for 9-11.
The price of such ineffectual but diplomatic complacency with the U.N. and other questionable allies of the United States, is just too high.

So until the other nations of the world begin to act in a more proactive and decisive way of dealing with global crises, and not letting them fester because of U.N. inaction for 12 years or more, despite blatant defiance and genocide, I again have to say:

Quote:

---

britneyspearsatemyshorts said:
the us policy at least removed a brutal dictator and saved thousands from torture and murder for generations to come. whatever the motives i am pleased with the outcome.

---

Quote:

---

the G-man said:
I seriously think Chant is my favorite European and/or liberal on this board.

---

Liberal?

come to think of it G-man, that's cutting it close to an insult....

calling me a liberal, the audacity, the sheer audacity....

Quote:

---

"Bush arguably has committed the greatest strategic blunder in modern memory. To put it bluntly, he attacked the wrong target. While he boasts of removing Saddam Hussein from power, he did far more than that. He decapitated the government of a country that was not directly threatening the United States and, in so doing, bogged down a huge percentage of our military in a region that never has known peace. Our military is being forced to trade away its maneuverability in the wider war against terrorism while being placed on the defensive in a single country that never will fully accept its presence. There is no historical precedent for taking such action when our country was not being directly threatened. The reckless course that Bush and his advisers have set will affect the economic and military energy of our nation for decades. It is only the tactical competence of our military that, to this point, has protected him from the harsh judgment that he deserves.

At the same time, those around Bush, many of whom came of age during Vietnam and almost none of whom served, have attempted to assassinate the character and insult the patriotism of anyone who disagrees with them. Some have impugned the culture, history and integrity of entire nations, particularly in Europe, that have been our country's great friends for generations and, in some cases, for centuries.

Bush has yet to fire a single person responsible for this strategy. Nor has he reined in those who have made irresponsible comments while claiming to represent his administration. One only can conclude that he agrees with both their methods and their message...."

---

Quote:

---

March 17, 2004


Blix Believed Iraq Possessed Banned Arms

The former U.N. inspector, on a book tour, says even Hussein may have thought so.


By Maggie Farley, Times Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS — Former chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix said Tuesday that until the final days before the war, he and U.S. officials — and perhaps even Saddam Hussein — believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. But rather than taking the time to find out for sure, he said, the momentum of war preparations made the Bush administration deaf to evidence that contradicted their conclusions.

"They were wrong. Their conviction was based on faith, and it was wrong," he said. Given a little more time, Blix added, the weapons inspectors might have been able to discredit some of the misinterpreted intelligence.

"We did come to a more accurate picture than the national agencies did," he said. "So that should be a lesson for the future."

Blix, on a 10-day tour to promote his new book a year after the war began, returned to the United Nations on Tuesday to speak and sign hundreds of copies of "Disarming Iraq" for diplomats who spent an hour in line.

It was a quiet hero's welcome for the meticulous, deliberate official who by happenstance helped put the world body at the center of the debate over how to disarm Iraq. Once depicted as the man who held the question of war and peace in his hands, he still maintains that the Security Council — and ultimately, just the United States — had the power to decide the issue.

Although he is convinced that the war was "preplanned, but not predetermined," he wrote that he couldn't escape the feeling that the inspectors' work was meant to merely fill time until the U.S. military was ready. It was not simply a question of whether Iraq had an active weapons program, he wrote. It was more a question of, "We know the answers. Give us the intelligence to support those answers." He never did get that information. Then the clock ran out on March 16 of last year.

"I could not say in the middle of March that there are no weapons of mass destruction," he said Tuesday.

For his cautious and methodical approach to weapons inspections, the 75-year-old Swede was vilified, investigated and treated with contempt by Washington.

In a meeting with Vice President Dick Cheney in October 2002, the American made clear that he thought inspections were useless and the U.S. "was ready to discredit inspections in favor of disarmament."

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz ordered an investigation into Blix's background. David Kay, a former inspector with the International Atomic Energy Agency who recently resigned as head of the U.S. weapons search team in Iraq, attacked Blix for failing to uncover clandestine nuclear efforts in Iraq and North Korea while heading the U.N. agency from 1981 to 1997.

A year later, the large caches of weapons of mass destruction the Bush administration alleged were in Iraq still have not been found. In a satisfying coda for the mild-mannered Blix, it was his former employee and critic, Kay, who admitted: "We were all wrong."

The lessons Washington should learn, he said, are to use more critical judgment and less reliance on defectors, and to "get off the spin." The administration's portrayal of its intelligence was meant to create "a far more ominous picture than there was," Blix said.

"Saddam was not a threat to the region, he was not a danger to his neighbors," Blix said. "He was a horror to his own people. The rest was an oversell."

---

Quote:

---

Poland 'Misled' on Iraq, President Says

Thu Mar 18, 6:18 PM ET


By MONIKA SCISLOWSKA, Associated Press Writer

WARSAW, Poland - President Aleksander Kwasniewski, a key U.S. ally, said Thursday that Poland was "misled" about whether Saddam Hussein's regime had weapons of mass destruction and was considering withdrawing troops from Iraq several months early.

The remarks came as polls show about half of Poles are opposed to involvement in Iraq and after deadly bombings in Madrid — possibly by al-Qaida in retaliation for Spain's alliance with the United States — triggered fears of a terror attack on Polish soil.

Kwasniewski's comments were the first by a Polish leader to raise doubts about the intelligence behind the decision for going to war. He tempered them by stressing that Poland is not about to abandon its mission in Iraq, and said Iraq was a better place without Saddam.

"But naturally I also feel uncomfortable due to the fact that we were misled with the information on weapons of mass destruction," Kwasniewski told French reporters, according to a transcript released by his press office.

"This is the problem of the United States, of Britain and also of many other nations," he later told a news conference.

Despite his comments, U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (news - web sites) said she did not think Poland was withdrawing its support for the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.

"I talked to the Poles, and they think they were a bit misinterpreted here, because there's been no stronger ally in this than the Poles," Rice said in a CNN interview. She said President Bush (news - web sites) and Kwasniewski had discussed the issue of Saddam's alleged arsenal "and they went to war for the right reasons."

Poland contributed 2,400 combat troops to the Iraq invasion and now commands a 9,500-strong multinational force, making it one of Washington's staunchest allies. But while many Poles feel historically close to the United States, public support for the mission in Iraq has been tepid.

A poll last week found 42 percent of adults in favor and 53 percent opposed. The CBOS survey had a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points.

Kwasniewski's criticism of the prewar intelligence also puts him in line with widespread public sentiment in Western Europe, just before Poland joins the European Union (news - web sites) on May 1.

"Poland so far lacked a necessary balance before the EU entry. It was too pro-American," said Janina Paradowska, a commentator for the Polityka weekly. "Now is the time to have better European cooperation."

State Department spokesman Adam Ereli, reacting to reports of Kwasniewski's remarks, also said Washington does not believe Poland is wavering: "We have no reason to have any ... questions or doubts about Poland's steadfast support of the mission in Iraq."

As early as November, a poll found 75 percent of Poles feared the country's role in Iraq would lead to a terrorist attack at home.

"I don't think the president's remarks are linked only to the situation after Madrid, but in general ... with the effects of involvement in Iraq, and with the fact that the public opinion is tired with our involvement," Bronislaw Komorowski, a former defense minister, told The Associated Press.


Another reason for Kwasniewski's blunt remarks may be Polish disappointment that wartime loyalty has not led to more Iraq reconstruction contracts and an easing of U.S. visa requirements for Poles — points Kwasniewski recently raised with Bush.

"Kwasniewski addressed his remarks to Washington, not to Warsaw," said Zbigniew Lewicki, head of the American Studies Center at Warsaw University. "Kwasniewski was in Washington in January to demand a visa waiver and contracts ... and came back with nothing."

The Polish-led force in Iraq includes 1,300 troops from Spain, whose new government has said it wants to withdraw them by June 30 unless the United Nations (news - web sites) takes control of peacekeeping.

Kwasniewski, speaking after a meeting of his top security officials to discuss Poland's response to the Madrid bombings, said he will urge Spain to reconsider its decision.

Earlier Thursday, Kwasniewski said Poland may start withdrawing its troops from Iraq early next year, months before previously planned. He cited progress toward stabilizing Iraq.

"Everything suggests that pullout from Iraq may be possible after the stabilization mission is crowned with success and, in my assessment soon, it may be the start of 2005," Kwasniewski told RMF.FM radio. Previously, Polish officials said they might start withdrawing troops in mid-2005.

Spain's new government made its pullout threat shortly after winning elections Sunday, three days after the Madrid bombings.

Kwasniewski insisted that Poland — where security officials have acknowledged lacking experience in dealing with terrorist attacks — would not bow to terror.

"We are facing the same threat as Spain," Kwasniewski said in the radio interview, but he stressed that "terrorism must be combatted, also with force."

---

Quote:

---

March 18, 2004


Campaign Opens for Censure of Bush

From Reuters

WASHINGTON — Military families and antiwar activists urged Congress on Wednesday to censure President Bush for what they called his deception and manipulation of intelligence before the Iraq war.

"The best way that the United States Congress can honor those brave men and women in uniform who have served in Iraq, and who continue to serve in Iraq, is to honor the truth," said Sue Niederer.

Her 24-year-old son, Army Lt. Seth Dvorin, was killed in Iraq in February.

"They can do so by holding accountable those who deceived and manipulated the American people to justify the invasion and occupation of Iraq, starting with President Bush," Niederer said at a news conference outside the U.S. Capitol.

As Bush was inside for a St. Patrick's Day luncheon, the soldiers' families and antiwar activists displayed boxes of petitions calling for censure of the president.

The group Win Without War said it had gathered 560,340 signatures endorsing a censure resolution.

A statement released at the news conference contrasted Bush's public comments on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq with CIA and media reports disputing the White House pre-war position that Iraq possessed these weapons.

The censure campaign is led by Win Without War, a coalition of 42 organizations, along with MoveOn.org, True Majority, Working Assets and Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities.

The business group plans an ad campaign to begin Friday.

The ad, set to run in the New York Times, is headlined, "Have you noticed what's happening to chief executives who lie?"

It goes on to say, "It's time for someone in this government to step forward and take personal responsibility for the deadly deceptions used to mislead this great nation into war.

"And that someone must be Bush."

On Saturday, the anniversary of the start of the Iraq war, antiwar activists including a group of military families, plan to demonstrate outside the Ft. Bragg military base in Fayetteville, N.C.

The groups include Military Families Speak Out, Bring Them Home Now coalition, United for Peace and Justice, September 11th Families of Peaceful Tomorrows and Veterans for Peace.

At least two counterdemonstrations supporting the Bush administration's military policies are scheduled to be held the same day in Fayetteville, which is home to one of the largest military bases in the United States.

---

Quote:

---

whomod said:
I guess this is the part where the usual suspects here on these boards belittle our allies and call them cowardly for the audacity to finally call Bush on his bullshit.

Quote:

---

Poland 'Misled' on Iraq, President Says

Thu Mar 18, 6:18 PM ET


By MONIKA SCISLOWSKA, Associated Press Writer

WARSAW, Poland - President Aleksander Kwasniewski, a key U.S. ally, said Thursday that Poland was "misled" about whether Saddam Hussein's regime had weapons of mass destruction and was considering withdrawing troops from Iraq several months early.

The remarks came as polls show about half of Poles are opposed to involvement in Iraq and after deadly bombings in Madrid — possibly by al-Qaida in retaliation for Spain's alliance with the United States — triggered fears of a terror attack on Polish soil.

Kwasniewski's comments were the first by a Polish leader to raise doubts about the intelligence behind the decision for going to war. He tempered them by stressing that Poland is not about to abandon its mission in Iraq, and said Iraq was a better place without Saddam.

"But naturally I also feel uncomfortable due to the fact that we were misled with the information on weapons of mass destruction," Kwasniewski told French reporters, according to a transcript released by his press office.

"This is the problem of the United States, of Britain and also of many other nations," he later told a news conference.

Despite his comments, U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (news - web sites) said she did not think Poland was withdrawing its support for the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.

"I talked to the Poles, and they think they were a bit misinterpreted here, because there's been no stronger ally in this than the Poles," Rice said in a CNN interview. She said President Bush (news - web sites) and Kwasniewski had discussed the issue of Saddam's alleged arsenal "and they went to war for the right reasons."

Poland contributed 2,400 combat troops to the Iraq invasion and now commands a 9,500-strong multinational force, making it one of Washington's staunchest allies. But while many Poles feel historically close to the United States, public support for the mission in Iraq has been tepid.

A poll last week found 42 percent of adults in favor and 53 percent opposed. The CBOS survey had a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points.

Kwasniewski's criticism of the prewar intelligence also puts him in line with widespread public sentiment in Western Europe, just before Poland joins the European Union (news - web sites) on May 1.

"Poland so far lacked a necessary balance before the EU entry. It was too pro-American," said Janina Paradowska, a commentator for the Polityka weekly. "Now is the time to have better European cooperation."

State Department spokesman Adam Ereli, reacting to reports of Kwasniewski's remarks, also said Washington does not believe Poland is wavering: "We have no reason to have any ... questions or doubts about Poland's steadfast support of the mission in Iraq."

As early as November, a poll found 75 percent of Poles feared the country's role in Iraq would lead to a terrorist attack at home.

"I don't think the president's remarks are linked only to the situation after Madrid, but in general ... with the effects of involvement in Iraq, and with the fact that the public opinion is tired with our involvement," Bronislaw Komorowski, a former defense minister, told The Associated Press.


Another reason for Kwasniewski's blunt remarks may be Polish disappointment that wartime loyalty has not led to more Iraq reconstruction contracts and an easing of U.S. visa requirements for Poles — points Kwasniewski recently raised with Bush.

"Kwasniewski addressed his remarks to Washington, not to Warsaw," said Zbigniew Lewicki, head of the American Studies Center at Warsaw University. "Kwasniewski was in Washington in January to demand a visa waiver and contracts ... and came back with nothing."

The Polish-led force in Iraq includes 1,300 troops from Spain, whose new government has said it wants to withdraw them by June 30 unless the United Nations (news - web sites) takes control of peacekeeping.

Kwasniewski, speaking after a meeting of his top security officials to discuss Poland's response to the Madrid bombings, said he will urge Spain to reconsider its decision.

Earlier Thursday, Kwasniewski said Poland may start withdrawing its troops from Iraq early next year, months before previously planned. He cited progress toward stabilizing Iraq.

"Everything suggests that pullout from Iraq may be possible after the stabilization mission is crowned with success and, in my assessment soon, it may be the start of 2005," Kwasniewski told RMF.FM radio. Previously, Polish officials said they might start withdrawing troops in mid-2005.

Spain's new government made its pullout threat shortly after winning elections Sunday, three days after the Madrid bombings.

Kwasniewski insisted that Poland — where security officials have acknowledged lacking experience in dealing with terrorist attacks — would not bow to terror.

"We are facing the same threat as Spain," Kwasniewski said in the radio interview, but he stressed that "terrorism must be combatted, also with force."

---

---

Poland's president says troops will remain in Iraq as long as needed
Fri Mar 19, 3:40 PM ET

MONIKA SCISLOWSKA

WARSAW, Poland (AP) - President Aleksander Kwasniewski reassured U.S. President George W. Bush (news - web sites) on Friday that Polish troops will stay in Iraq (news - web sites) "as long as needed," a day after suggesting they might leave months early.



In a phone call from Bush, Kwasniewski also brought up his remark Thursday that he was "misled" by intelligence about Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s weapons of mass destruction.


He said "misunderstandings" about his remarks should be discounted because Poland's alliance with the United States was strong, his national security adviser Marek Siwiec said.


"We will be in Iraq as long as needed to achieve the intended goals, plus one day longer," Kwasniewski told Bush, according to Siwiec.


Poland sent combat troops to the Iraq war and commands a postwar multinational force of some 9,500 troops, including 2,400 of its own, a sign of its allegiance to Washington.


But the Madrid train bombings and the new Spanish government's threat to withdraw its soldiers from Iraq have raised serious concern in Warsaw.


On Thursday, Kwasniewski said he believed Iraq was stabilizing and that Polish troops might start leaving early next year, months earlier than the mid-2005 withdrawal previously cited by Polish leaders.


His remarks were the first by any Polish leader to criticize prewar intelligence reports, an issue that has led to controversy in Britain and he United States.


But Siwiec emphasized that the Polish president was criticizing intelligence failures in general, not Washington: "It was not a complaint by Poland addressed to the United States."


The 20-minute talk with Bush had been previously scheduled to coincide with the anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Siwiec said. In Washington, the White House stressed Poland's commitment, distributing a statement from Kwasniewski's office.


"Poland will not withdraw from Iraq until the mission of stabilization is successfully accomplished and counts on effective co-operation with the United States, Great Britain, Spain and other NATO (news - web sites) and UN member states," the statement said.


"Any demonstration of weakness in view of terrorist attacks undermines the foundations of democracy, nations' security and world peace," it said.


Prime Minister Leszek Miller said Friday that Poland remains committed to postwar peacekeeping, but would like to see Iraqis regain sovereignty.


"We wish that our troops return as soon as possible and do not spend in Iraq a single day longer than is necessary," Miller said.


When he spoke Thursday, Kwasniewski had already tempered his criticism by saying Poland still believes that invading Iraq was the right thing to do and that the country is a better place without Saddam.


"But naturally I also feel uncomfortable due to the fact that we were misled with the information on weapons of mass destruction," Kwasniewski told French reporters.


Poor whomod

Quote:

---

FORMER WHITE HOUSE TERRORISM ADVISOR: BUSH ADMIN WAS DISCUSSING BOMBING IRAQ FOR 9/11 DESPITE KNOWING AL QAEDA WAS TO BLAME

Fri Mar 19 2004 17:49:30 ET

Former White House terrorism advisor Richard Clarke tells Lesley Stahl that on September 11, 2001 and the day after - when it was clear Al Qaeda had carried out the terrorist attacks - the Bush administration was considering bombing Iraq in retaliation. Clarke's exclusive interview will be broadcast on 60 MINUTES Sunday March 21 (7:00-8:00 PM, ET/PT) on the CBS Television Network.

Clarke was surprised that the attention of administration officials was turning toward Iraq when he expected the focus to be on Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. "They were talking about Iraq on 9/11. They were talking about it on 9/12," says Clarke.

The top counter-terrorism advisor, Clarke was briefing the highest government officials, including President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in the aftermath of 9/11. "Rumsfeld was saying we needed to bomb Iraq....We all said, 'but no, no. Al Qaeda is in Afghanistan," recounts Clarke, "and Rumsfeld said, 'There aren't any good targets in Afghanistan and there are lots of good targets in Iraq.' I said, 'Well, there are lots of good targets in lots of places, but Iraq had nothing to do with [the 9/11 attacks],'" he tells Stahl.

Clarke goes on to explain what he believes was the reason for the focus on Iraq. "I think they wanted to believe that there was a connection [between Iraq and Al Qaeda] but the CIA was sitting there, the FBI was sitting there, I was sitting there, saying, 'We've looked at this issue for years. For years we've looked and there's just no connection,'" says Clarke.

Clarke, who advised four presidents, reveals more about the current administration's reaction to terrorism in his new book, "Against All Enemies."

Developing...

---

An independent commission will investigate allegations that United Nations staff collected millions of dollars in illegal profits from the program that allowed Iraq to sell some of its oil to pay for food during the years of economic sanctions.

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced plans Friday for an independent commission that would go beyond an internal United Nations probe of alleged corruption and mismanagement in the oil-for-food program.

U.S. congressional investigators have also looked into the program, charging this week that Saddam Hussein's government smuggled oil, added surcharges and collected kickbacks to rake in $10.1 billion in violation of the United Nations' oil-for-food program.

Quote:

---

whomod said:
Hey neo-cons, read what your own Drudge says
(you trust Drudge, dont you?)

http://www.drudgereport.com/flash60.htm

Is is clear now why Rummy resisted the requests
for reinforcing the Afghani expeditionary force.
Their real focus was on Iraq, Al-Qaeda be damned.

Quote:

---

FORMER WHITE HOUSE TERRORISM ADVISOR: BUSH ADMIN WAS DISCUSSING BOMBING IRAQ FOR 9/11 DESPITE KNOWING AL QAEDA WAS TO BLAME

Fri Mar 19 2004 17:49:30 ET

Former White House terrorism advisor Richard Clarke tells Lesley Stahl that on September 11, 2001 and the day after - when it was clear Al Qaeda had carried out the terrorist attacks - the Bush administration was considering bombing Iraq in retaliation. Clarke's exclusive interview will be broadcast on 60 MINUTES Sunday March 21 (7:00-8:00 PM, ET/PT) on the CBS Television Network.

Clarke was surprised that the attention of administration officials was turning toward Iraq when he expected the focus to be on Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. "They were talking about Iraq on 9/11. They were talking about it on 9/12," says Clarke.

The top counter-terrorism advisor, Clarke was briefing the highest government officials, including President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in the aftermath of 9/11. "Rumsfeld was saying we needed to bomb Iraq....We all said, 'but no, no. Al Qaeda is in Afghanistan," recounts Clarke, "and Rumsfeld said, 'There aren't any good targets in Afghanistan and there are lots of good targets in Iraq.' I said, 'Well, there are lots of good targets in lots of places, but Iraq had nothing to do with [the 9/11 attacks],'" he tells Stahl.

Clarke goes on to explain what he believes was the reason for the focus on Iraq. "I think they wanted to believe that there was a connection [between Iraq and Al Qaeda] but the CIA was sitting there, the FBI was sitting there, I was sitting there, saying, 'We've looked at this issue for years. For years we've looked and there's just no connection,'" says Clarke.

Clarke, who advised four presidents, reveals more about the current administration's reaction to terrorism in his new book, "Against All Enemies."

Developing...

---

---

Of course when Al Franken wrote a chapter on this (Operation Ignore)in his Lying Liars book (using credible sources) he was "hate filled" and "irrational". He was everything he should have been (according to the neocons and their blind followers and enablers) in order to divert attention from what he was saying and instead focus on himself and his supposed lack of credibility because he was a "lib".

It's all going to come back and fuck with you apparently. At least we know why the Administration was so reluctant to cooperate with the 9/11 panel. Because all those "unproven" allegations were in danger of being proven and we couldn't attack the accusers of being without facts to back them up otherwise.

Quote:

---

Bush Accused of Ignoring Al Qaeda Until After 9/11

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Bush ignored the threat of al Qaeda for months and did too little to stop the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States, a former administration counterterrorism official said Sunday.

Richard Clarke's accusations, aired in a CBS "60 Minutes" interview, drew a detailed point-by-point rebuttal from the White House as it attempted to defend Bush's standing as a presidential candidate who is tough on terrorism.

In the program on his book to be launched Monday, Clarke charged that Bush had done "a terrible job" in addressing the threat from terrorism.

"I find it outrageous that the president is running for re-election on the grounds that he's done such great things about terrorism. He ignored it. He ignored terrorism for months, when maybe we could have done something to stop 9/11," Clarke told CBS.

"I think the way he has responded to al Qaeda, both before 9/11 by doing nothing, and by what he's done after 9/11, has made us less safe," said Clarke, who was Bush's top counterterrorism expert until he resigned in February 2003 after serving in every U.S. government since the Reagan administration.

In an unusually detailed statement seeking to debunk what it labeled "myths" from Clarke's book, the White House denied the assertion that Bush did not treat al Qaeda as a serious threat before it attacked the United States.

"The president specifically recognized the threat posed by al Qaeda and immediately after taking office the White House began work on a comprehensive new strategy to eliminate al Qaeda," the White House said.

"The president specifically told (national security adviser) Dr. (Condoleezza) Rice that he was 'tired of swatting flies' and wanted to go on the offense against al Qaeda, rather than simply waiting to respond."

Rice defended the administration's response to the terrorism threat in a Washington Post op-ed column Monday, saying that through the spring and summer of 2001, Bush's national security team developed a strategy to eliminate al Qaeda.

"This became the first major foreign-policy strategy document of the Bush administration -- not Iraq (news - web sites), not the ABM Treaty, but eliminating al Qaeda," Rice said.

Clarke, who headed a cybersecurity board before resigning, is set to testify this week before the independent commission investigating the 2001 hijacked airplane attacks in New York and on the Pentagon (news - web sites) that killed some 3,000 people.

The White House rebutted Clarke's charge that before the Sept. 11 attacks the administration was focused on Iraq rather than on al Qaeda and that immediately after the attacks it searched for a way to blame Saddam Hussein (news - web sites).

Clarke said Bush took him aside the day after the 9/11 attacks and ordered him to "see if Saddam did this. See if he's linked in any way."

Clarke said he responded that al Qaeda was responsible and that Iraq was not linked to the attacks. However, he agreed to look into Bush's request and again found no cooperation between Saddam and al Qaeda.

Deputy national security adviser Steve Hadley disputed Clarke's characterization of the president's request.

"The point, I think, is that of course the president was trying to find out who caused 9/11. ... And he couldn't rule out the possibility that it might have been Iraq, and he asked for the intelligence that we had on a possible link between Iraq and 9/11," Hadley told "60 Minutes."

Clarke also said the day after the Sept. 11 attacks, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld suggested bombing Iraq, despite the lack of any evidence of Baghdad's involvement.

When told al Qaeda's bases were in Afghanistan (news - web sites), not Iraq, Clarke said Rumsfeld responded that there were no good bombing targets in Afghanistan, but there were plenty of such targets in Iraq. Clarke said he thought at first that Rumsfeld was joking, but quickly realized that he was serious.

Among other claims in Clarke's book, "Against All Enemies," is that the Bush administration ignored intelligence "chatter" in 2001 about possible terror attacks, according to CBS.

---

Funny how the "liberals" all all out to "get' Bush. When his own people expose his bullshit, there is an equally ridiculous explanation in order for you guys to happily stick your heads back in the sand with no apologies.

First Paul O'Neil and now the Bush Terrorism Expert.
Both Bush Executive Branch insiders.Then there's Hans Blix, Joe Wilson, and Kay on no WMD's.

It's only March and already the Bush facade
is cracking. Ha Ha

Of course none of what he's saying is new. Still, it is certainly gratifying to have another highly qualified insider calling you Bush fellaters on your bullshit.

The Man who knew

The Secret History

Oh.... Are the Bushes assholes? Pretty much. 500+ dead for a lie.

I know I know, the dream of a WASP Christian1950's-like utopia/theocracy is now really in jeapordy.

I'm guessing G-Man is eagerly awaiting Hannity's talking points who undoubtedly is in a war room meeting with fellow propagandists as I type to find something, ANYTHING to smear Clarke, to deflect attention from what he's saying and shut him up!!! But.....

As the former head counter-terrorism honcho, Clarke knows what and what did not happen and how politics dictated the U.S. response prior to and after 9/11.

He's not disgruntled - he will be portrayed as such.

He's not illogical - they (the current administration) will say his facts are incorrect.

He's not political - they will say he's out to help Kerry win the presidential election.

This man is one more in a string waiting on the sidelines to tell what really has been going on in the past several years at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

This refreshing inside look is good for all of us because we see more than just the point-counterpoint garbage on television.

O'Neal and now Clarke understand that loyalty to what is best for the nation is more important than loyalty to the commander-in-chief (and to his lies)-- especially one that is an incompetent scoundrel! When will some of us do the same?

Incidentally, Clarke Is testifying under oath this week. That's more than Bush or his lying bunch of thugs have done. For if you testify under oath, they can come after your lying ass later when the truth is revealed and prosecute your lying scumbag ass.

Clarke has done more for his country tonight than Bush has done in three years.

She added that Clarke may be trying to protect himself by lashing out at the administration.

"In 1998, when Dick Clarke was the counterterrorism czar, Al Qaeda had bombed U.S. embassies. We, of course, heard that Al Qaeda was suspected of bombing the [USS] Cole in 2000 when Dick Clarke was counterterrorism czar. And we learned that plots against the U.S. had been hatching since the '90s, when Dick Clarke was counterterrorism czar."

Quote:

---

Rob Kamphausen said:
y'know, whomod, i actually read that article before in the YAHOO news section. and no, it doesn't look pretty.

but it also went on to discuss how dubya was the second president to ignore clarke's warnings.

clinton had a few years of clarke's input. dubya had a few months.

no, it doesn't excuse anyone for ignoring the information -- but it also doesn't justify blaming solely one person.

---

Yes, Rob !

I dislike how G.W. Bush is blamed for everything. I've extensively acknowledged that he has made a few mis-steps.
And what President doesn't ?

But as you say, "dubya was the second president to ignore clarke's warnings".
And "dubya" was the second president to deal with many other problems that are heaped on Bush, as if they began with him:

Clinton had 8 years to solve the North Korean situation that Bush inherited.

Clinton did not invade Iraq, despite reports since 1995 by Iraqi high ranking military defectors that Iraq had a secret WMD program, and were hiding it from U.N weapons inspectors. And Clinton didn't invade even when inspectors were thrown out entirely in 1998 and did nothing to resolve the Iraq situation. That Bush inherited.

Clinton arguably is the cause of Bin Ladin's international superstardom among muslims, because he clearly didn't do enough to stop Bin Ladin, which led to 9-11. That Bush inherited.

And the economic recession that is blamed on G.W. Bush actually began on Clinton's watch, A YEAR BEFORE BUSH TOOK OFFICE. That Bush inherited.

I think Bush Sr is partly responsible for these things, too.
Particlularly invoking the Kurds and Shi'ites in Iraq to rise up in 1991 against Saddam, and then watching them get slaughtered.
And not doing more to promote democratic reforms in Russia, and not offering more aid in the early years(1991-1992) of the Soviet collapse, to steer Russia away from authoritarian elements and kleptocracy.

And the same CIA and NSA intelligence that has failed Bush Sr. (regarding the collapse of the Eastern Europe and Soviet Union) is the same intelligence that failed G.W. Bush ( pre-intelligence on 9-11, pre-invasion Iraq intelligence, North Korea developing nukes, Libya's nuclear program ).

But hey, what do I know, I'm just a mindless automaton of the "Bushies", a neocon stooge, who blindly accepts every word G.W. Bush and his administration says.

Quote:

---

the G-man said:

So, Clarke expects us to believe that he was this lonely voice of reason that was ignored by everyone in both the Clinton and Bush administrations?!!?

Then, there's the fact that Clinton claims he tried to warn Bush about Al Quaeda.

If Clinton didn't listen to Clarke, as is the implication, why would Clinton try to warn Bush?

This book looks like nothing so much as a pre-emptive strike by Clarke, in order to save his own reputation over the fact that the 9-11 plot (as well as the bombing of the Cole and several other terrorist acts) was plotted and/or executed while on his watch.

---

So you think Clark is lying???

Remember, if he is, he's testifying UNDER OATH.

Have Bush go after him then after he testifies.

Then have the entire Administration present the TRUTH UNDER OATH as well.

Problem solved.

Lessee...

According to the Bush administration, here's just a few other "disgruntled employees":

Paul O'Neil - Bush Administration Cabinet Member

Richard Clarke - Bush Administration Head of Counter Terrorism

Gen. Anthony Zinni - Bush Administration Special Envoy to the Middle East and US Marine General

Gen. Edward Shishenski - US Army Chief of Staff

Roy McGovern - CIA analyst 27 years

Joe Wilson - Career US diplomat, including stint as US ambassador to Iraq during the 1st Gulf War, where Bush 1 awarded him a Presidential Citation for securing the release of 150 American "human shields" held by Saddam prior to Desert Storm

Col. Karen Kwiatowski - 20 year Air Force intelligence officer, last assigned to the Bush Administration created Office of Special Plans

Gee, I wonder if so many "disgruntled employees", many of them long standing Republicans, could have anything to do with

A LYING, INCOMPETENT ADMINISTRATION THAT IS MORE CONCERNED WITH IT'S OWN PLUTOCRATIC PLUNDERING AND FAR RIGHT POSTURING THAN IT IS WITH THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

things to consider...

Bush's lengthy family ties to Bin Laden and the Saudi's...

Bush won't give but a measily hour of his precious time to the 9/11 investigation...

Not under oath of course ( )

He forbids Ms. Rice to be questioned by investigators... Tells Rumsfeld and Powell not to campaign for him...

He won't unseal 9/11 documents that have everything to do with the Saudi's, claiming "sensitive information"...

ARE YOU AWAKE OUT THERE??!?

How on EARTH could ANYONE still stand up for the guy?

He makes Nixon look child's play.

At least Nixon had the courage and decency to resign.

Quote:

---

Rob Kamphausen said:
y'know, whomod, i actually read that article before in the YAHOO news section. and no, it doesn't look pretty.

but it also went on to discuss how dubya was the second president to ignore clarke's warnings.

clinton had a few years of clarke's input. dubya had a few months.

no, it doesn't excuse anyone for ignoring the information -- but it also doesn't justify blaming solely one person.

---

Quote:

---

whomod said:
I don't have time to get into Clinton's antiterrorism record right now so i'll get back to that. Still, 'doing nothing' is a gross and inaccurate slander of his record which I hear reepeated too often by the usual suspects.

---

Quote:

---

whomod said:
the interview was a lot more lengthy, damning, and meaty than the YAHOO story.

---

Quote:

---

britneyspearsatemyshorts said:
Whomod, isn't that what you do all day about Bush? You know it's really sad your obsession and blind hatred. In all seriousness have you ever considered help? It can't be healthy to have these kinds of feelings about someone.

---

Yeah. I realize you're still reeling from Clark's 1-2 punch. So i'll give you time to come back later with a better retort.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4568982/

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/21/terror/main607659.shtml



*********************************************************

1998-99

-- Clinton sponsors legislation to freeze the financial assets of international organizations suspected of funneling money to bin Laden's Al Qaeda network, but it is killed, on behalf of big banks, by Republican Senator Phil Gramm of Texas. George Bush will later call for identical legislation

-- but only after September 11, 2001.

********************************************************************

Bush, spending 5 hours at rodeo and 4 hours at NASCAR but no time for the 9/11 panel??! How many hours did Clinton spend testifying about a blowjob?...and this dufus does not want to spend more than one hour testifying about this country's failure to protect us !!!! And he doesn't want to do it under oath either. So what reason is there to beleive anything he says then??

If this government is, in theory, of the people, by the people and for the people then the voting public has every right to witness these interviews with ALL those involved. Clinton's hearing was very public and he wasn't responsible for over 500 deaths of our own military personel.

I say it is our future. This is a man who destroyed all relations with other nations in less than 4 years. WE DESERVE TO SEE HIS LAME EXCUSES.





KEE-YAH!!! (a swift kick to the gut).

WAAAAHH! Everyone hates Bush! WAAAAHH! Sour Grapes!! WAAAHH! "Liberal media!! WAAAH!

Quote:

---

Ex-Iraq WMD Hunter Fears U.S. Credibility Erosion

Mon Mar 22,10:47 PM ET


By Missy Ryan

CAMBRIDGE, Mass. (Reuters) - The former chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq (news - web sites) warned on Monday that the United States is in "grave danger" of destroying its credibility at home and abroad if it does not own up to its mistakes in Iraq.

"The cost of our mistakes ... with regard to the explanation of why we went to war in Iraq are far greater than Iraq itself," David Kay said in a speech at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

"We are in grave danger of having destroyed our credibility internationally and domestically with regard to warning about future events," he said. "The answer is to admit you were wrong, and what I find most disturbing around Washington ... is the belief ... you can never admit you're wrong."

(Boy does that ever sound familar! - whomod )

The comments by Kay came as the White House sought to fend off accusations from its former anti-terrorism czar, Richard Clarke, who said President Bush (news - web sites) ignored the al Qaeda threat before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and focused on Iraq rather than the Islamic militant group afterward.

The White House last year cited Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as the main reason for going to war.

Kay resigned his post in January, saying he believed no such arms existed and that the failure to find any such weapons raised serious questions about the quality of prewar intelligence.

Kay, who was part of United Nations (news - web sites) weapons probes in Iraq in the early 1990s, said U.S. intelligence there was poor in the decade before the war, relying entirely on international inspectors themselves, Iraqi defectors or intelligence from allies like France and Britain.

He cautioned the intelligence community against jumping to premature conclusions, as it did in Iraq. "One of the most dangerous things abroad in the world of intelligence today actually came out of 9/11 ... the insistence of 'Why didn't you connect the dots?' The dots were all there," he said.

"When we finally do the sums on Iraq, what will turn out is that we simply didn't know what was going on, but we connected the dots -- the dots from 1991 behavior were connected with 2000 behavior and 2003 behavior, and it became an explanation and a picture of Iraq that simply didn't exist," Kay said.

---