Originally Posted By: the G-man


About the best that any president can do, other than spew simplistic populist rhetoric, is try and encourage less fuel usage, alternate techonogies and better gas mileage. But, again, the market tends to do that better that the government in any event.




riiiight.

Here's your industry self regulating as it pertained to vehicle safety.



 Quote:
AUTO SAFETY: A BRIEF HISTORY

1960s

While the concern for passenger car safety has been discussed by the auto industry and government since the birth of the automobile, the public debate did not begin until the mid 1960s. It was Ralph Nader's Unsafe at Any Speed, the Silent Spring of auto safety, that first catapulted safety to the forefront of public attention.

In Unsafe at Any Speed, the public at-large learned for the first time of the auto industry's total disregard for the issue of safety in the design of the popular - but lethal - General Motors Chevrolet Corvair.

As Ralph Nader brought auto safety issues into the public's consciousness, Congress began highly publicized hearings on auto safety. These hearings eventually led to the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the Highway Safety Act of 1966.

For the first time, these two laws called for the regulation of the transportation industry and the development and enforcement of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS).

One of the act's key provisions was the establishment of the National Highway Safety Bureau, now known as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which was charged with the task of developing and enforcing auto safety standards.

During its early years, NHTSA concentrated on the development of three distinct groups of vehicle safety regulations:

1. Equipment Standards: For equipment such as tires, brakes and steering that assist the driver in avoiding a collision (crash avoidance).

2. Interior Component and Impact Performance Standards: For instrument panels, steering wheels, front seat belts, head restraints and doors designed to protect occupants during a collision (crashworthiness).

3. Post-impact Performance Standards: For fuel system integrity and material flammability, for example, intended to protect occupants following a collision (crashworthiness).

The transportation industry has responded reasonably well to crash avoidance standards. It developed radial-ply tires, disk brakes and improved steering. But its record of developing crashworthiness standards is atrocious.

The industry resisted minimum performance standards proposed by the government, effectively delaying their implementation. Standards that were finally adopted reflected political compromises instead of state-of-the-art design and engineering concepts. By threatening long and costly legal challenges, the industry pressured the government to lower performance levels.

1970s

The battle for improved crashworthiness moved to the courts in the 1970s. It was fought by accident victims who sued manufacturers for injuries and deaths that would not have occurred if the vehicles involved had been properly designed, engineered and manufactured.

The courts recognized that manufacturers were in the best position to know the inherent dangers associated with accidents and how best to protect vehicle occupants. Many lawsuits revealed the incredible fact that certain manufacturers had the technology available to produce a safer vehicle. But because of slightly higher costs and the fact that it was not required by law, the manufacturers chose to maximize their profits rather than incorporate safety technology in production vehicles.

As a result, the law developed the concept of crashworthiness; occupants have the right to a reasonably safe car. Manufacturers who fail to build a reasonably safe vehicle will be held accountable to accident victims and their families. Never before had the industry experienced such an assault from both federal legislation and court decisions. It fought back with intense lobbying in Washington.

Lee Iacocca (then with Ford Motor Company) and Henry Ford II earned their own controversial place in the history of Watergate. Their bargaining with President Nixon and his aide, John Ehrlichman, in 1971 resulted in an extensive delay and eventual reduction of minimum performance requirements for numerous proposed FMVSS and is documented in the infamous Watergate tapes.

Not content with defusing the potential impact of FMVSS on the cost of its passenger cars, the auto industry went one step further. In a move that condemned thousands of victims to unnecessary injuries and deaths, the auto industry was able to convince legislators to exclude light trucks and utility vehicles from the requirements of passenger car safety standards. Yet, at the same time, the industry's advertising campaigns were trying to convince the public to buy more light trucks and utility vehicles, which could be driven like cars but also accommodate large families and business needs.

What the auto industry could not accomplish through political muscle in Washington, it attempted to achieve in court. During the 1970s, there were numerous cases where courts found that manufacturers lied under oath about safety defects in their vehicles. Further, the industry withheld critical data from the government. It sued a cost/benefit analysis in an attempt to sway decision-makers away from proposed safety standards.

The public's knowledge of the potential dangers in unsafe passenger cars increased dramatically after Mother Jones magazine ran the first national expose on the fuel system defects of the Ford Pinto and Bobcat. Shortly afterward, in the case of Grimshaw v. Ford, a California jury returned a verdict of more than $120 million in punitive damages. The award was to punish Ford for choosing to increase its profits by more than $100 million rather than spend a few dollars to fix the Pintos and Bobcats. (The case was subsequently settled for about $6 million.) Several years later, in the case of Durrill v. Ford, which involved a Ford Mustang, a Texas jury awarded $100 million in punitive damages after it learned the car had most of the same mechanical components as the Pinto and Bobcat. During the case, Ford management testified that it expected the Mustang to leak fuel during rear impacts over 25 mph - and considered that an acceptable condition.
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1980s

By the early 1980s, many cases similar to Grimshaw and Durrill forced the car companies to redesign fuel systems.

Today only a few manufacturers place a fuel tank under the trunk floor, between the back bumper and rear axle, a location extremely vulnerable during low-speed rear collisions. But most manufacturers still insist on using multi-piece fuel filler necks that can fail during rear and side crashes.

The battle for auto safety, especially with light trucks and utility vehicles, still rages. Injuries and casualties continue to mount and the public remains at risk.

FUEL SYSTEMS

There are almost 100 million vehicles still on our nation's highways with unsafe fuel system, unable to withstand a reasonable rear impact without the risk of catastrophic fire.

Neither the government nor the auto industry is making any effort to ix these vehicles or get them off the road. The risk is especially high among those people who, as result of economic circumstances, drive older vehicles - the same cars that generally have the most dangerous fuel systems.

Although there has been progress in the design of safer fuel systems for passenger cars, the auto industry has been grossly negligent in failing to provide the same level of safety for occupants of light trucks and utility vehicles. Because of political compromises, these vehicles, while being used primarily today in the same manner as passenger cars, are exempt from most crashworthiness standards. There is no excuse for these omissions except lack of perseverance by the government and the financial greed and political clout of the auto industry.

In any case, the innocent public is still the victim.
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RESTRAINT SYSTEMS

Three-point lap and shoulder belts were first introduced in the United States by Volvo of Sweden and widely criticized by domestic auto manufacturers. Their protests grew louder in 1967 when the government announced that these belts would be required for front-seat occupants in all 1968 passenger cars sold in the United States.

This requirement was nearly postponed when both Ford and GM said the belts could be dangerous. NHTSA, however, issued the belt standard based on Volvo's tests in 28,850 accidents involving 10,000 vehicles.

When the government attempted to further protect front-seat occupants by requiring passive restrained systems, such as airbags, the auto industry responded with court challenges. In response to government efforts to make passenger cars safer, the auto industry began advocating the use of lap and shoulder belts. The industry told the public that seat belts save lives and that occupant safety had finally been achieved. At the same time, however, it was still not installing shoulder belts for rear-seat passengers.

By the mid 1980s, two-thirds of the states had adopted seat belt usage laws. Starting with the 1990 model year, all new cars sold in the United States were required to have a passive front-seat belt system or a driver's side airbag.

The result? Car companies are telling the public that they are pro safety, the safety war is over and the consumer has won. They are saying these things despite the fact that NHTSA first began forcing the industry to provide lap and shoulder belts for rear-seat occupants in 1990 passenger cars and in 1992 light trucks and utility vehicles - 20 years after they were mandated for front-seat passengers.

Further, the industry was slow to provide passive restraints for front- and rear-seat passengers. As a result, the refinement of air bag protection and their ability to provide maximum protection was also delayed.

Due to a peculiarity in the way federal regulations are written (reflecting political compromise), a passive restraint system can be no ore than a shoulder strap without a lap belt. During front impacts, however, front seat occupants secured only with a shoulder harness will submarine under the belt and suffer severe injuries or death from striking the instrument panel or being ejected from the vehicle.

Domestic manufacturers provide front-seat shoulder belts that are anchored by a slack-inducing windowshade-type retractor. Anyone riding in a late model domestic car knows that when leaning forward or pulling slowly on the belt, it will catch and remain loose. The introduction of more than a few inches of slack into a belt system virtually destroys its ability to protect occupants from injury during even low-speed front impacts.

For rear-seat occupants, the decision to use the lap-only belts can be fatal, especially for children.

Numerous government and industry tests, as well as actual vehicle collisions, have demonstrated the horrible fact that rear seat belts maim and kill when not worn with a shoulder harness. In these instances, the lap belt rides up and over the hip bones, severs the intestines, arteries and sometimes the spinal cord, resulting in severe disability, paralysis or even death.

Although passenger cars are now required to have shoulder belts in the outboard rear-seat positions, there has been no effort by the government or the industry to provide such belts for the center rear-seat position.

How many deaths and injuries can be avoided if the industry implements safety technology when it is first available and makes subsequent improvements to those systems in a timely manner?
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SIDE-IMPACT CRASHES

More than 8,000 people die and about 23,000 others suffer serious injuries in the United States each year as a result of side-impact collisions. Thirty-five percent of all life-threatening injuries occur during such collisions.

While the side-door impact standards, established by NHTSA in the early 1970s, offered a stopgap measure of protection, stricter standards proposed in the 1980s were finally approved. Those long-awaited rules settle the issue of rival test dummies developed by various auto companies. Auto manufacturers have heavily criticized NHTSA for its test procedures. General Motors even went so far as to claim that the new requirements could make passenger car interiors more dangerous.

BODY STRUCTURE

As a result of the energy crisis in the 1970s, the government instituted Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFŠ) requirements, forcing manufacturers to improve gas mileage.

Without compromising engine performance, the easiest way to improve mileage was to reduce vehicle weight. This approach led both the domestic and foreign auto industries to use lighter and stronger materials, such as high-strength low-alloy steel in the body of vehicles.

But most manufacturers have been unable to meet the unique requirements of welding high-strength low-allow to the cold rolled sheet steel of the automobile. As a result, the vehicles - intended to protect occupants during collisions - disintegrate in mild collisions because of substandard welds.

UTILITY VEHICLES

The popularity of Jeeps and other on-and off-road vehicles has increased dramatically in the past decade - and so has the number of serious and fatal injuries associated with rollover accidents.

Utility vehicles share certain characteristics with passenger cars. Utility vehicles, though, have a short wheelbase, high center of gravity, still suspension and, typically, four-wheel drive. Consequently, in fatal accidents, according to NHTSA studies, Jeep CJs and Toyota Land Cruisers are more likely to roll over than other types of vehicles. In fact, utility vehicles roll over at least five times more frequently than passenger cars.

Jeep-Eagle faces numerous lawsuits seeking millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Internal memoranda, substantiating plaintiffs' claims that the vehicles are highly unstable with a fatal tendency to roll over unexpectedly, have been protected by an Ohio court from further disclosure because of an alleged privileged relationship between AMC (the former manufacturer of Jeeps) and a former employee.

But the Jeep is not alone with these problems. Other manufacturers of utility vehicles have also been the subjects of NHTSA investigations. Utility vehicles designed for both on-and off-road uses are consequently less stable when driven on the highway and more prone to rolling over than conventional vehicles. Because of the inadequate design of these vehicles, occupants are often partially or completely ejected in rollovers. In addition, many of these vehicles suffer from inadequate roof structure - subjecting those who remain in the vehicle to injuries when the roof collapses. There are about 400,000 CJs still in use, just a small fraction of all the dangerous utility vehicles on the road today.

Youthful buyers, the target of advertising by manufacturers, are given a false sense of the vehicles' stability. In the real world, accidents often result in catastrophe. Until all of these vehicles are recalled or removed from service, the number of serious injuries and deaths will continue to mount.
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STEERING COLUMNS

In an attempt to minimize driver injuries during frontal collisions, the government in 1968 required collapsible steering wheels and columns.

The industry has no problems meeting the government's minimum standards. As long as a driver hits a steering wheel exactly according to the test design, the collapse mechanism performs as expected. But if the driver hits the wheel at a slightly different angle, the mechanism can cause serious or fatal injuries.

This dangerous situation arises every time there is a front collision that is not exactly in line with the tests, or if a tilt steering wheel is adjusted to one of its many up or down positions.

Although some foreign manufacturers offer vehicles with steering wheels that collapse during off-center impacts, the majority of the auto companies are perfectly happy meeting the minimum requirements and show little concern for saving lives.

Who pays for these lax standards? Once again, it is the car buyers and their passengers who suffer thousands of unnecessary injuries and deaths.

CONCLUSION

The auto industry has a dismal safety history. It has steadfastly refused to take the leadership position in motor vehicle safety. Prodding by courts, Congress and consumer groups has been met with political manipulation and well-financed deceptive advertising.

A quarter of a century after the American public was informed that many cars were unsafe at any speed, the situation has not improved nearly as much as it should have. There are still millions of unsafe motor vehicles in everyday use.

Despite the many problems that exist, there has been significant progress. consumer justice attorneys have litigated meritorious cases. Consumers have reported defects to the government. Secrecy agreements that hide safety hazards are finally being publicly scrutinized and challenged. Public consciousness is again being raised to pressure Congress for tougher safety standards for all motor vehicles.

The industry, like a reluctant bridegroom, must still be brought to the altar of public accountability. Only by continuing \with this unrelenting effort with the motoring public get the safety it rightly deserves. The fight for auto safety is not over.